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I
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decisions under the pollution control statutes
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reach
startlingly anti-environmental results, but they are explained more by
the Court’s overwhelming hostility toward the private enforcement of
statutes, rather than an anti-environmental bias. 1 Adding insult to
 Jeffrey G. Miller is a Professor of Law at Pace Law School in White Plains, New
York.
 Brooke S. Dorner earned her Juris Doctor degree from Pace Law School in 2011 and
practices law in Washington, D.C.
1 Jeffrey G. Miller, The Supreme Court’s Water Pollution Jurisprudence: Is the Court
All Wet?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Is the Court all Wet?]
(examining Clean Water Act (CWA) citizen suits to identify a trend of possible hostility
by the Court against private enforcement rather than an anti-environmental bias). See also,
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injury, in one of the rare victories for private environmental plaintiffs
in those decisions, Justice Kennedy queried whether citizen suits
intrude on the President’s Article II executive power and violate the
separation of power principles.2 While other Justices have raised the
same concern,3 Justice Kennedy’s invitation is particularly significant
because he is a swing vote in environmental and other social justice
cases.4
Justice Kennedy’s invitation to challenge the constitutionality of
citizen suits followed scholarly challenges that environmental citizen
suits intrude on the executive power of Article II5 and contemporary

Jeffrey G. Miller, The Supreme Court’s Pollution Control Jurisprudence: Is the Court an
Enemy of the Environment? (April 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Pollution Control Jurisprudence]. Brooke Dorner assisted on this manuscript.
This research determined whether hostility by the Court against private enforcement
existed for all environmental statutes. Of the Court’s fifty-six decisions under the pollution
control statutes administered by EPA, nineteen were in private enforcement actions, in
which the Court reached pro-environmental results in only three decisions, or 16%. In the
remaining thirty-seven decisions in non-private enforcement cases, however, the Court
reached pro-environmental results in nineteen, or 51%. Id.
2 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197
(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556 (1992). Justice Scalia, in the midst
of analyzing why the respondents lacked Article III standing, linked standing with Article
II. “To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most
important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” Id. at
557; see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 209 (Scalia and Thomas, J.J. dissenting,
noting with approval Justice Kennedy’s Article II query in that decision); Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36–37
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting, O’Conner & Thomas, J.J., joining in dissent, on Article II
grounds because the majority opinion allowed plaintiffs to sue the government when they
had no individual injuries). Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 778 n.8 (2000) (noting that while the Court upheld plaintiff’s Article III standing to
bring a qui tam action, it did not consider whether qui tam suits violated Article II).
4 Chantz Martin, The Clean Water Act Suffers a Crushing Blow: The U.S. Supreme
Court Clears the Way for the Mining Industry to Pollute U.S. Waters, 49 WASHBURN L.J.
933, 947 n.123 (2010) (observing that Justice Kennedy is the swing vote on environmental
issues); see also Mark Latham, The 2008–2009 Term and the Clean Water Act: Justice
Kennedy Where Art Thou?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293 (2010); Miller, supra note 1, at
138; Kenneth M. Murchison, Four Terms of the Kennedy Court: Projecting the Future of
Constitutional Doctrine, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2009).
5 William H. Lewis, Jr., Environmentalists’ Authority to Sue Industry for Civil
Penalties is Unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 ENVTL. L. REP.
10101 (1986). Accord Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55 (1989); Charles S. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forests:
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reiteration of the unitary theory of executive power, 6 providing
additional theoretical underpinning for those challenges. 7 Scholars
accepted the invitation and ably defended citizen suits.8 However, a
few scholars, apparently less sure of the defenses, scrambled to find
other avenues for private enforcement.9
Defendants in citizen suit cases have occasionally raised the issue
unsuccessfully in lower courts. 10 The unanswered question is why

How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution’s
Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1995).
6 The unitary executive theory, in a more modest articulation, can be traced back to THE
FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), which emphasized that unity of the executive
branch made it both effective and responsible to the people. By unity he meant that there
was only one President, not two or more, and not an executive council. It also meant that
the President had control over his subordinates. Id.
7 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1992); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 701 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash, Executive Power].
8 See Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges “Take Care” of
Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, Private “Enforcers,” and Lessons
from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (2001); Stephen M. Johnson, Private
Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REV.
383 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1993); Cass
R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 213 (1992).
9 See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005)
(advocating that statutes authorize their implementing agencies to tailor the nature and
extent of private enforcement, thus avoiding arguments that private enforcement interferes
with enforcement discretion); Adam J. Sulkowski, Ultra Vires Statutes: Alive, Kicking,
and a Means of Circumventing the Scalia Standing Gauntlet in Environmental Litigation,
24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 75 (2009) (advocating use of corporate law to prevent companies
from violating environmental statutes on the theory that illegal actions are ultra vires);
David Krinsky, How to Sue without Standing: The Constitutionality of Citizen Suits in
Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301 (2007) (advocating use of Article
I courts for private enforcement against the government).
10 See N.C. Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 200 F. Supp. 2d 551
(E.D.N.C. 2001); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope, 823 F. Supp.
1065 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Del. Valley Toxics Coal. v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987); Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J.,
Inc. v. Monsanto Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1474 (D. N.J. 1985).
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they have not done so more often. A closer look at the issue 11 is
warranted by the overwhelming hostility of the Court toward citizen
suits; 12 the continued development of the unitary theory of the
executive branch; 13 the Court’s embrace of that theory in its latest
separation of powers decision;14 new insights and research into the
origins and nature of prosecutorial discretion; 15 and changes in the
composition of the Court making it potentially more sympathetic to
Article II challenges.16
Critics challenge that citizen suits violate three aspects of Article
II: the Vesting Clause, the Appointments Clause, and the Faithful
11 For a recent example of this re-examination, see Robert L. Glicksman, The
Constitution, the Environment, and the Prospect of Enhanced Executive Power, 40 ENVTL.
L. REP. 11,002 (2010).
12 Miller, Pollution Control Jurisprudence and Is the Court all Wet?, supra note 1.
13 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); Mark Tushnet, A Political
Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (2010);
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005)
[hereinafter Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor]; Prakash, supra note 7; Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 7; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 7.
14 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010). Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the majority is a classical unitarian analysis in
tone, conflating the Vesting Clause and the Faithful Execution Clause and emphasizing the
central importance of the President’s power to remove subordinates, the President’s public
accountability for actions of the entire executive branch, and the consequent suspicion of
independent agencies. The decision held that Congress could not limit the ability of the
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to removal of members of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board to “for cause” removal, when the President’s ability to
remove commissioners from the SEC was already limited to “for cause” removal. Id.
15 See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369 (2009); Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion
in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1 (2009); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1994); Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v.
Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990); Susan Low Bloch, The Early
Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There was
Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561 (1989); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the
Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474 (1989); Harold
J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History,
38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13.
16 Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist. Rehnquist had become a
functionalist on separation of powers issues. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988). Based on his majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, Roberts may be both a
formalist and a unitarian. Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Conner. Alito is generally more
conservative than O’Conner, who had become increasingly favorable to environmental
interests. Miller, Is the Court All Wet?, supra note 1, at 138. Finally, Justice Kagan
replaced Justice Souter. This change will make much less of a difference than the others,
but the other changes are generally unfavorable to citizen suit interests.
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Execution Clause. The Vesting Clause states: “The executive Power
shall be vested in a President.”17 Citizen suit critics assert that law
enforcement prosecution is an executive function vested solely in the
President and citizen enforcement infringes on executive power. The
Appointments Clause authorizes the President, “with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate,” to appoint “Officers of the United States” and
authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint “inferior Officers” in
the President, the Courts, or the Heads of Departments.18 Critics assert
that because citizen enforcers exercise an executive prosecutorial
function, they must be appointed by the President. Finally, the
Faithful Execution Clause states that the President “shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 19 Critics assert that citizen
enforcement makes it impossible for the executive to faithfully
execute the laws, because he has no control over a significant class of
law enforcers. The three clauses are related, in that 1) the Vesting
Clause and the Faithful Execution Clause both turn on the meaning of
“executive” and “execute” and 2) the Court decided many challenges
to statutory limitations on the President’s power to appoint and
remove executive officials based on a statute’s effects on the
President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws.20
Part II of this article describes citizen suits and their role in the
enforcement of environmental law. Part III outlines the background of
separation of powers and the dominant theories of analyzing
separation of powers issues. Part IV explores the roles of public and
private enforcement before and after the framing of the Constitution
and the effects of those roles on interpreting the three relevant
constitutional clauses. Part V examines Appointments Clause
challenges to citizen suits. Part VI examines Vesting Clause and Take
Care Clause challenges to citizen suits. This article concludes that
citizen suits are constitutional under the Vesting Clause and the Take
Care Clause and do not violate the Appointments Clause.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
20 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 133 (1926); Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890).
17
18
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II
CITIZEN SUITS
Citizen suits are statutory causes of action brought by private
plaintiffs against defendants violating the host statutes. They are
typified by Section 304 of the Clean Air Act (CAA),21 the first of the
citizen suit provisions in the pollution control statutes. Section 304
authorizes suit against EPA for failing to perform a mandatory duty
under the statute, and against members of the regulated public for
violating air pollution control requirements under the Act. The first is
a statutory mandamus provision. The second is a classic private
enforcement provision. The two are separable and raise different
separation of powers questions.22 This article focuses on the second.
Section 304 of the CAA23 requires the plaintiff to give sixty days’
notice to EPA, the relevant state, and the potential violator before
filing suit against most violations and advance notice before filing suit
against violations excepted from the sixty-day period.24 If EPA or the
state takes and diligently prosecutes an enforcement action in federal
court prior to the filing of a citizen suit, the citizen suit is barred,
although the citizen may intervene in the federal action.25 After the
citizen suit is filed, EPA may intervene as a matter of right and no
consent decree may be filed in a suit to which it is not a party, without
an opportunity for it to review the decree and comment on it to the
court.26 To enter a consent decree in this context, courts must find that
the decree is: 1) the result of good faith bargaining rather than
collusion, 2) fair, just, and equitable, and 3) consistent with the statute
being enforced. 27 A court should defer to EPA’s comments 28 on
whether the proposed decree complies with the statute at issue and is
in the public interest. If the citizen plaintiff prevails, the court may
assess civil penalties and order compliance.29 Penalties are paid into

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q, § 7604 (2012).
See Glicksman, supra note 11, at 11,004-05; Johnson, supra note 8, at 387–93.
23 Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2010).
24 Id. § 304(b).
25 Id. § 304(b)(1)(B).
26 Id. § 304(c)(3).
27 See United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Alaska 1977).
28 Although it is the United States, not EPA, that brings or intervenes in a civil
enforcement action, and it is the Department of Justice (DOJ) that represents the United
States before the courts, in almost all cases DOJ will act at the request of EPA.
29 Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2010).
21
22
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the federal treasury,30 although part of the penalties may be applied
toward an environmental improvement. 31 The court may award
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties,32 although awards to successful
plaintiffs are common and awards to successful defendants are rare.33
There are slight variations among the provisions in the different
statutes,34 but they all follow the pattern established by Section 304 of
the CAA. Citizen suits have proven to be important in the
enforcement of the pollution control statutes, 35 with citizens filing
more than half of the number of civil actions as the federal
government.36
In light of the Court’s pervasive hostility toward citizen suits, it is
only a question of time until the Court grants certiorari on the issue of
whether citizen suits unconstitutionally intrude on executive power
under Article II. That constitutional confrontation also seems
inevitable in light of the Court’s curtailment of citizen suits under
Article III, imposing steadily more restrictive standing requirements,37
and Justice Scalia’s conflation of Articles II and III underpinning his
standing doctrine.38 Standing did not become a serious constitutional
matter in citizen suits until the 1980s, when Justice Scalia seized
Article III’s “cases and controversies” restriction on the courts’
jurisdiction as a basis to deny standing for private plaintiffs who
failed to suffer individual injuries from those violations. Earlier
Id. § 304(g)(1); see also Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2010).
Id. § 304(g)(2).
32 Id. § 304(d).
33 JEFFREY G. MILLER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 716 (2008).
34 E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6975,
6972(a)(1)(B) (2012) (providing that citizens may file suit to abate imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment caused by solid or hazardous waste,
regardless of whether it arises from a violation of the statute).
35 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1998); James R. May, Now
More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER. L. REV. 1, at
1, 5 (2003); Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A Comparison of Government and
Citizen Suit Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995–2000,
29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 385–86 (2004); David R. Hodas, Enforcement of
Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When
Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54
MD. L. REV. 1552, 1620 (1995).
36 Smith, supra note 35, at 385–87.
37 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998).
38 See supra note 3; see also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation
Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781 (2009).
30
31
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standing jurisprudence focused on whether the parties had sufficient
stakes in a dispute to assure they fairly presented it to the courts,
framing standing concerns more as prudential rather than as
constitutional concerns. 39 This article does not examine the issue of
Article III standing, because it is amply analyzed by the existing
literature. 40 Instead, the article focuses on the Article II issues,
because they have been subject to far less analysis by the Court or
scholars.
III
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
As basic as separation of powers is to our understanding of the
Constitution, that document does not use the term or anything like it.
Instead, the doctrine emerges from the structure of the Constitution
and the writings of the framers of the Constitution, particularly THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). The original Constitution
contains seven articles; the three articles allocating powers among the
three branches of government occupy eighty percent of its space. The
first article, by far the longest, vests the “legislative Powers” granted
therein (the enumerated powers) in Congress. The second article, a
little shorter, vests “executive Power” in the President. The third,
shorter still, vests “judicial Power” in the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as Congress establishes. In these three articles, the
Constitution also created a system of checks and balances between the
branches, giving each branch discrete powers over the others.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 41 explains that the framers of the
Constitution embedded separation of powers to prevent any one
branch from aggrandizing its powers, thereby avoiding tyranny over
the people by any branch or by the government generally. The
framers of the Constitution “viewed the principle of separation of
powers as a vital check against tyranny.”42 Of course, King George of
England and the executive power he personified was the most obvious
version of the tyranny the young country wished to avoid. Indeed, the
39 Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of
Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 316–32 (2001).
40 Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light of
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169 (1997).
41 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
42 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
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Declaration of Independence listed eighteen specific complaints
against “He,” the King, 43 although colonial complaints were often
occasioned by acts of Parliament rather than of the King. For
instance, Parliament enacted the tax on tea, which lit the spark of
revolt, at least in Boston. But the Declaration conflated complaints
against parliamentary enactments and royal actions as actions “He
[the King] has combined with others” to take. 44 The Declaration
suggests that if the framers of the Constitution looked for guidance to
events leading to the Revolution, they did not intend the executive to
be the dominant branch of government. Indeed, it is second place to
the legislative branch in the Constitution both in sequence and in
length. At the same time, delegates to the Constitutional Convention
sought to create a viable executive, in reaction to the absence of an
executive branch under the then operative Articles of Confederation,
leading to ineffective government, especially in foreign relations.45
It is not completely clear how prosecution of federal offenses fits
into this constitutional framework, for the Constitution does not
mention prosecution.46 However, we are accustomed to the notion that
prosecutorial functions are executive in nature and performed by the
executive branch. The statements in Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Morrison, that “[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of
crimes is a quintessentially executive function,” and that when
prosecution is conducted by government “always and everywhere” it
has “been conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and
always by the executive,” are consistent with this notion. 47
Characterizing prosecution as a core executive function led Justice
Scalia to conclude that a statute infringing on executive prosecution
power is unconstitutional. The Constitution does not vest in the
President “some of the executive power, but all of the executive
power.”48
In Morrison, however, a seven to one majority upheld the
constitutionality of a statute creating an independent counsel, not
appointed by the President and subject only to limited executive
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3–20 (U.S. 1776).
Id. at para. 15.
45 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 3, 4, supra note 6 (John Jay), NOS. 15, 16 (Alexander
Hamilton); see also infra note 82.
46 See discussion infra Part VI.A.
47 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988).
48 Id. at 705.
43
44
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supervision and control, to investigate and prosecute the criminal
offenses of a limited number of high-executive officials. The more
measured conclusion by the majority in Morrison that “[t]here is no
real dispute that the functions performed by the independent counsel
are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions
that typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive
Branch,”49 makes more sense than Justice Scalia’s pronouncements,
because neither the Constitution nor its historical explanatory
documents mention or consider prosecution. Moreover, there is
significant evidence suggesting the framers of the Constitution did not
consider prosecution to be a quintessentially executive function.50 The
majority ultimately concluded that the special prosecutor statute was
constitutional because it did not “impermissibly burden[] the
President’s power” or “unduly interfere[] with the role of the
Executive Branch,” a balancing decision. 51
The difference between the approaches of Justice Scalia and the
majority in Morrison illustrates the dichotomy between the dominant
theories of separation of powers interpretation: formalism (Justice
Scalia’s rigid dissent) and functionalism (the majority’s flexible
approach). It does so in a decision of considerable relevance to our
inquiry, involving all three of the constitutional clauses examined
here, in the context of a prosecutor who was generally free of
executive supervision. In the separation of powers decisions cited in
the article, the majority opinion invariably uses a formalistic analysis
when it overrules an action by one of the three branches of
government as violating separation of powers principles and
invariably uses a functionalistic analysis when it upholds such an
action. Virtually all of the decisions have dissents, which invariably
use the opposite analysis to the formalism or functionalism used by
the majority opinions. Single justices may take both formalist and
functional approaches in different decisions. Indeed, in the separation
of powers decisions of the 1980s, Justice White was the only Justice
to take consistently functionalist positions, Justice Scalia was the only
Justice to take consistently formalist positions, and the other Justices

49 Id. at 691. Indeed, the Court has long considered prosecution to be an executive
function; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976).
50 See infra Part III.
51 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692–93.
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generally migrated from formalist positions in the earlier decisions to
functionalist positions in the later decisions.52
Formalism, also known as originalism, focuses on the text of the
Constitution and understanding of the document by its framers and
often relies on historical evidence.53 It sees separation of powers as
three relatively rigid silos, with little intermixing of functions, except
as specifically provided by the Constitution, usually in the form of
checks and balances. It is suspicious of independent agencies and
novel governmental structures. It would engage in a two-stage
analysis, asking whether a function was executive in nature and, if so,
whether Congress bestowed it anywhere but on the executive branch.
If answers to both questions are positive, the statute is
unconstitutional.
The recently rearticulated unitary executive theory is a formalistic
theory featuring a robust and expansive reading of executive power,
and focusing particularly on the President’s authority to appoint and
remove executive officials at will as a necessary means of controlling
and exercising executive power. It envisions all executive power
flowing to and from the President, enabling him to control all
executive decisions and functions exclusively, completely, and
comprehensively. His undiluted authority makes him wholly
responsible and publicly accountable for all executive functions,
rooting the unitary executive theory in the President’s democratic
accountability to the public. Query what that really means, when the
public cannot recall a President, when a President is in his second
term and cannot stand for re-election, and when an objectionable
executive action is accompanied by hundreds of other executive
actions, some acceptable, some not, and most neutral?
The unitary executive theory is built on the word “unity,” which
the Constitution does not use. That is not an indictment of the
concept, since the Constitution does not use “separation of powers,”

52 E.g., Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison, 487 U.S. 654; Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
53 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 239
(2009). Originalists have developed so many variants that it is hard to precisely define
originalism. Indeed, Justice Scalia, “the most outspoken and revered of originalist judges,”
uses variants “he has otherwise criticized in order to reach results that appear to be
consistent with his personal preferences.” Id. at 293, 297.
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either. THE FEDERALIST uses “unity” to distinguish between an
executive branch with one head rather than with two or more heads or
even an executive council, concluding that an executive branch with
only one head is far preferable.54 Unitarians advance unity to a more
lofty level by arguing the Constitution vests the single executive with
absolute and complete control over anything and everything done by
all executive employees, for any less control would deprive him of the
ability to accomplish his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws. 55 The theory is most expansively articulated by Steven G.
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, in The Unitary Executive.56 Their
central focus is on the disarming thesis that the President’s power to
appoint executive officials, regardless of whether the Constitution
requires their appointments to be approved by the Senate, carries with
it the power to dismiss them without cause and without approval of
the Senate.57 Calabresi and Yoo characterize the removal power as “a
fault line between the tectonic plates represented by the presidency
and the Congress,”58 or between advocates of the unitary executive
54 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 6 (Alexander Hamilton). “Advantages of a
Single Executive,” for instance, uses “unity” at least five times in explaining that an
executive with one head can act with more energy, speed, vigor, and accountability than
two or more executives or an executive council. Id.
55 See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692–93 (1974), in which the unitary theory is
starkly argued by President Nixon in response to the Special Prosecutor’s enforcement of a
subpoena duces tecum for the President’s tape recordings and documents in connection
with the Watergate investigation. The President claimed, unsuccessfully, that the dispute
was an intra-family squabble between superior and inferior officers within the executive
branch, presenting no justiciable dispute for the courts to resolve. Id. For an opinion with a
distinctly unitarian flavor to it, see Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
56 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13. Accord Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra
note 6.
57 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 6. The Constitution requires Senate approval
for some appointments, but is silent on removal. Appointment with the approval of the
Senate and removal without the approval of the Senate is asymmetrical, but makes sense
both in terms of management and constitutional politics. If the President makes a
nomination for office and the Senate disapproves of the nomination, there are likely other
nominees acceptable to both the President and the Senate. However, once the President has
lost confidence in an official confirmed by the Senate, if the Senate must but does not
approve removal, the President must proceed with an official who he does not trust, a
dysfunctional situation. The origin of Senate approval of appointments was the “great
compromise” between large and small states, resulting in a Senate favoring small states
and a House of Representatives favoring large states. Senate approval of appointments
enabled small states to assure large states did not get all of the plum appointments, a
purpose not subverted by the President’s removal of disloyal or poorly performing
officials without senate approval. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111 (1926).
58 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 6.

DORNER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/5/2013 9:55 AM

The Constitutionality of Citizen Suit Provisions
in Federal Environmental Statutes

413

principle and those taking a more modest view of executive power.
The bulk of the book examines each presidency to demonstrate that
all Presidents have claimed and most have exercised unrestricted
removal power, in an attempt to undercut any argument that the
executive has acquiesced in congressional incursions on that
executive authority.
That the President may remove cabinet and subcabinet appointees
without congressional approval is a fairly common sense notion; to do
his job the President must be able to surround himself with
subordinates who adhere to his policies and directives and in whom
he trusts. An unbounded and unrestricted presidential removal power,
however, is not as commonsense when applied to an independent
counsel appointed to investigate and prosecute executive officials
close to the President; the counsel probably cannot fulfill his
functions if the President can remove him at will. But under Calabresi
and Yoo’s articulation of the unitary executive theory, the President
has unrestricted constitutional power to remove at will cabinet and
subcabinet officials, independent prosecutors, 59 officials of
independent administrative agencies, 60 and civil servants, 61 and any
attempt by Congress to restrict his removal power is
unconstitutional.62 Justifying presidential removal of members of the
civil service, Calabresi and Yoo remind us the original purpose of the
civil service was to insulate government employees from the spoils
system, and they reassure us that purpose will be served as long as
superior scores on merit-based examinations are required for new
civil servants hired to replace those the President has fired for
political reasons or for no reason at all.63
The unitary executive theory most directly addresses citizen suits
through the appointment and removal power; unitarians would argue
that because citizen enforcers are executive officials, the President
must be able to appoint and remove them and Congress cannot
insulate them from presidential control. Part V of this article
concludes citizen enforcers are not officials and are not appointed,
and, therefore, are not subject to the Appointments Clause. It also

59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 6.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 6, 423–25.
Id. at 5–6, 422–23.
Id. at 7.
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concludes that persons do not have to be government officials to do
the government’s business. If appointment and removal are the main
concerns of the unitary executive theory, that theory is not inimical to
citizen suits.
The unitary executive theory, however, conflates the appointment
power with the vesting and faithful execution powers. According to
Calabresi and Yoo, the Vesting Clause and Faithful Execution Clause
give the President all executive power, including “the power to
remove and direct all lower-level executive officials,” making him not
only commander in chief of the armed forces but also “law
enforcement officer in chief of the federal government.” 64 This
ensures “energetic enforcement of the law,” promotes accountability,
and “eliminates conflicts in law enforcement and regulatory policy.”65
The bedrock principle of the unitary executive is that “whatever
executive power might exist must be exercised subject to presidential
supervision and control.”66 Without such control, the President cannot
assure that the laws are faithfully executed.67 If citizen suits are an
exercise of law enforcement authority, they must be subject to
presidential supervision and control, and any congressional attempt to
insulate them from such supervision and control violates separation of
powers principles. Calabresi and Yoo examine each of the
Presidencies, finding evidence that Presidents actually controlled
those who litigated for the United States in some specific litigation.
Others have concluded that law enforcement is the very essence of
executive power and authority.68 This articulation of executive power
conflates law enforcement and executive authority in a way that is
unlikely to have been envisioned by the framers of the Constitution,
as demonstrated in Part IV.
Functionalism conceives of separation of powers more flexibly,
explicitly or impliedly focusing on how to adapt two-century-old
constitutional concepts and phrases to situations and issues never
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
66 Id. at 20.
67 The Office of Legal Counsel has rejected this interpretation of the Faithful Execution
Clause, stating that the clause stands for “the proposition that the President has no inherent
constitutional authority to suspend the enforcement of the laws.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Memorandum for John Schmidt Associate Attorney General, Constitutional Limitations on
Federal Government Participation in Binding Arbitration (Sept. 7, 1995), http://www
.justice.gov/olc/arbitn.fin.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983)).
68 See Prakash, Executive Power, supra note 7.
64
65
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envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, making the document a
living and evolving set of principles and concepts, rather than an
unchanging dead hand of the past. Functionalism builds on the
concept that the Constitution does not require absolute separation, a
concept enunciated by THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 69 and by Justice
Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, first published in 1833. 70 Functionalism rejects the “archaic
view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight
departments of government.”71
Functionalists acknowledge that if Congress removes from the
President power that the Constitution specifically and unambiguously
assigned to him or transfers power from the President to Congress, the
statute is presumptively unconstitutional. But they also contend that if
Congress otherwise invades or interferes with presidential power to
achieve legitimate congressional goals, the statute is presumptively
constitutional if the attainment of the constitutional goals outweighs
the detriment to the President and the statute does not prevent the
President from achieving his constitutional responsibilities.72
The Court’s separation of powers decisions span such a broad
range of issues 73 that it is difficult to synthesize its separation of
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 6 (Alexander Hamilton). Harking back to
Montesquieu, Madison wrote that although the three great powers cannot be united in one
person or body without tyranny, the powers need not be wholly separated to do so. Rather,
“where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another department, the fundamentals of a free constitution are
averted.” Id. at 318.
70 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 197 (Carolina Academic
Press, 1987).
But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government,
and maintain, that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand
this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm, that they must be kept
wholly separate and distinct, and have no common link of connexion [sic] or
dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true meaning is,
that the whole power of one of these departments should not be executed by the
same hands, which possess the whole power of either of the other two departments;
and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free
constitution.
Id. at 197–98.
71 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (quoting the District Court
opinion, 408 F. Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)).
72 See The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20
Op. O.L.C. 124 (1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/delly.htm#N_1_.
73 See, e.g., Minstretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (discussing the validity of
sentencing guidelines promulgated by an organization in the judicial branch); Morrison v.
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powers jurisprudence. The Office of Legal Counsel74 has organized
the decisions around three useful principles,75 roughly reflecting the
fundamentalists’ analytical framework. First, where the Constitution
is “[e]xplicit and unambiguous,” 76 it must be strictly followed.
Second, when legislation directly or indirectly transfers executive or
judicial authority to Congress, the statute is unconstitutional.77 Third,
where legislation inhibits or prevents a branch from performing a
constitutionally assigned function, it may be constitutionally valid if a
strong congressional need to vindicate other objectives within its
authority outweighs the interference with the function.78

Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discussing the validity of a special prosecutor appointed by a
judicial committee to investigate and prosecute crimes against high executive branch
officials); Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (discussing the validity of a one house veto over actions
taken by the Attorney General under statutory authority); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (discussing the validity of a bankruptcy
court’s jurisdiction over a common law counterclaim); Nixon, 433 U.S. 425 (discussing the
validity of a statute entrusting presidential tapes and papers to the General Service
Administration); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(discussing the validity of the president’s seizure of steel mills to prevent a strike impeding
the war effort during the Korean conflict).
74 The Office of Legal Counsel is a division within the DOJ that represents and advises
the Office of the President.
75 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20
Op. O.L.C. 124, 20 (1996).
76 Id. (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945). In Chadha, the Court held that legislation
authorizing one house of Congress to veto action taken by the executive branch pursuant
to delegation from Congress was a legislative action that could only be effective with
bicameral action followed by presentation to the President for signature or veto, the
Constitution being explicit and unambiguous as to the procedural requirements for valid
legislative action. Chadha, 462 U.S. 19.
77 Constitutional Separation of Powers, supra note 72. “The structure of the
Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot
grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 726 (1986). The Court held that legislation authorizing the Comptroller General, an
officer removable only by congressional joint resolution or impeachment, to impose
spending limitations on the President not only invaded the President’s executive power but
did so by aggrandizing congressional power. Id.
78 Constitutional Separation of Powers, supra note 72 at 6. “Legislation that affects the
constitutional separation of powers but is consistent with the requirements of
bicameralism/presentment, the Appointments Clause, and the anti-aggrandizement
principle is subject to less searching scrutiny.” Id. When reviewing legislation that of this
type, “the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.”
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
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Part IV of this article demonstrates that citizen suits do not invade
a power the Constitution explicitly and unambiguously conferred on
the President. Moreover, citizen suits do not transfer any power from
the President to Congress. Part V demonstrates that the Appointments
Clause is inapplicable to citizen suit provisions. Part VI demonstrates
that the benefits of citizen suits in increased enforcement of the
pollution control statutes are significant and that the interference they
may cause the executive in carrying out his constitutional functions
are minimal, if they exist at all.
IV
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT: A LITTLE HISTORY
To understand exactly what the framers of the Constitution
intended in that document is sometimes a difficult task. It is elegantly
written and speaks for itself well on issues it explicitly addresses. On
many issues, however, the Constitution is silent; e.g., what is
executive power and does it include prosecution? On other issues it
may be ambiguous; e.g., do both the Vesting Clause and Faithful
Execution Clause confer power on the President? Because the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention did not maintain an
official record of its debates and kept the Convention’s proceedings
secret, our knowledge of its debates is limited to notes kept by a few
of its members, notably James Madison. 79 THE FEDERALIST,
commonly referenced as evidence for the intent of the framers, was
written after the convention by three of its delegates as propaganda
aimed at the debate in New York over the ratification of the
Constitution. 80 Many of the words the framers used in the
Constitution may resonate differently today than they did in the late
1700s. For instance, “the Law of Nations” in Article I, Section 8(16),
to a citizen of the late 1700s meant natural law and treaties, including
arbitration panels established by bi-lateral treaties, as expounded by

79 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION xvii, 31–33 (2d ed. 2005); RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE
CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY AND THE CONSTITUTION 186, 188–89, 198–99
(1996). The delegates were so concerned to maintain secrecy that they nailed shut the
windows of Independence Hall in Philadelphia through the long hot summer. Id. at 198–
99. See also JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 306–21 (1971).
80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 6.
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Vattel in his Law of Nations,81 while 200 years later it denotes a rich
mix of customary law and treaties, including treaties establishing
international organizations and international courts, organizations and
courts not conceived of in the late 1700s. When the framers of the
Constitution vested control over the Army and Navy in the President
in Article II, Section 2[1], little did they suspect that today we would
have military personnel and equipment hovering in air and space as
well as on land and sea. So too, in all probability the framers
conceived of “executive power” within the framework of the
authority then wielded by the King of England and his royal
governors in the American colonies, while we conceive of it with
reference both to modern separation of powers doctrine and to the
vastly expanded federal government we live with today.82 With this in
mind, it is useful to begin our analysis of the relationship between
private enforcement and public prosecution with an examination of
how the framers probably would have perceived them.
The framers’ domestic perceptions were largely an outgrowth of
the state of our country during their times. It consisted of four million
people spread thinly along the Atlantic seaboard from Savannah,
Georgia to Portland, Maine. The only means of communication from
Savannah to Portland was by word of mouth, handwritten letters, or
printed material moving by sailing ship, horseback, or stage coach. A
stage coach took six days to go from Boston to New York, in part
because of the almost complete lack of bridges.83 The economy was
largely agricultural, augmented by fishing and seagoing commercial
endeavor in the north. England had largely suppressed manufacturing
in the colonies to help promote it at home.
The Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, established a
Congress in which each state had one vote,84 nine votes were needed
to take important actions,85 and the vote of every state, together with a
ratification of their legislatures, was necessary to amend the
81 Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the U.S. Constitution: Reexamining the
History, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1113–18 (2011).
82 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15 for a more detailed exploration.
83 MORRIS, supra note 79, at 122. From May to November, mail was dispatched three
times a week from Maine to Virginia and twice a week from Virginia to Georgia and one
time less a week at other times. Even the infrequent dispatches were unreliable, due to
mail robbery and other causes. In February 1794, mail from the south arrived only twice in
seven weeks. JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1771–1789, at 158, 161, 165 (1935).
84 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 4.
85 Id. at art. IX, para. 6.
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Articles.86 The Articles authorized Congress to wage war and peace,
conduct foreign relations, mint money, spend money, undertake debt
and run a post office, but not to levy or collect taxes or to regulate
commerce. The Articles did not establish freestanding executive or
judicial departments. 87 Article IX, however, authorized Congress to
“appoint . . . committees and civil officers as may be necessary for
managing the general affairs . . . under their direction.”88 Under this
authority the Confederation Congress established organizations for
war, foreign affairs, finances, and the post office under the
supervision of congressional committees or commissions.89 Article IX
also authorized Congress to establish courts for piracy, felonies
committed on the high seas, and appeals regarding the law of capture,
but it did not exercise that authority.90 The Articles do not mention
prosecution or prosecutors. Indeed, while Congress established mail
robbery as a felony, it had to request that a state investigate, prosecute,
and punish a mail robbery felon.91
A. Public and Private Prosecution
The Constitution, of course, established executive and judicial
branches, in addition to a legislative branch. Mirroring the importance
of defense, foreign affairs, finances, and the postal service to the
Confederation Congress, the Constitution assigned national defense
and foreign affairs powers variously between Congress and the

Id. at art. XIII, para. 1.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting this as one of the glaring
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation).
88 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5.
89 Richard P. McCormick, Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the Confederation
Congress, 1781–1789, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 411, 426 (1997). The Post Office was
headed by a Postmaster General, who was not a member of Congress, but was closely
supervised by a congressional committee. The other organizations evolved quickly in
frustration with the inefficiency of legislative administration. They began as congressional
committees and generally developed into boards (congressional committees augmented by
non-congressional experts and clerks) and eventually into free standing departments able
to perform ministerial duties under close and continuing supervision by a congressional
committee and generally unauthorized to exercise policy judgment. SANDERS, supra note
83, at vii.
90 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1. Instead, it established rules
and procedures to be applied by state courts. Ordinances for establishing Courts for the
trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, April 5, 1781. McCormick, supra
note 89, at 424–25, 438.
91 SANDERS, supra note 83, at 161.
86
87

DORNER (DO NOT DELETE)

420

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

4/5/2013 9:55 AM

[Vol. 27, 401

President, and assigned Congress the authority to enact financial and
postal legislation. The First Congress followed suit, creating
departments for foreign affairs, war, and treasury, as well as
establishing a temporary post office, 92 the new executive
organizations generally assuming already functioning organizations
from the Confederation Congress.93
The President’s war and foreign relations powers are often called
“core executive powers” because the Constitution specifically
conferred them on the President.94 While some say that prosecution is
a core executive power as well,95 the Constitution did not specifically
confer a prosecution or law enforcement power on the President.
Indeed, the First Congress did not create a department of prosecution
or even a department of law, in part, perhaps, because there was no
functioning prosecution or law organization from the Confederation
Congress for the new government to assume.
The First Congress eventually created positions for an Attorney
General, a federal attorney for each judicial district, and a federal
marshal in each district in the last sections of the last significant
statute it enacted in its first session, entitled “An Act to establish the
Judicial Courts of the United States,” 96 commonly known as the
Judiciary Act of 1789. The initial draft of the Act by Oliver Ellsworth

92 1 Cong. ch. 4, July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28 (1789); 1 Cong. ch. 7, August 7, 1789, 1 Stat.
49 (1789); 1 Cong. ch. 12, September 2, 1789, 1 Stat. 65 (1789); 1 Cong. ch. 16,
September 22, 1789, 1 Stat. 70 (1789).
93 SANDERS, supra note 83, at 107, 121, 127, 189. John Jay and General Knox were the
last Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and War under the Continental Congress and the first
under President Washington. The departments were unimpressive. Jay’s Department of
Foreign Affairs, for instance, consisted of an under-secretary, a doorman, a messenger,
two clerks, and three interpreters. Id.
94 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“Core executive functions are
described in Article II . . . [I]t seems fair to assume that the powers specifically mentioned
were of central concern to the framers.”). A recent and well-reasoned law review article
noted the “longstanding tradition in OLC legal reasoning, most noticeably a tendency to
evoke ‘core’ executive powers to support presidential action in the realm of foreign affairs
or war powers.” Rachel Ward Saltzman, Executive Power and the Office of Legal Counsel,
28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 439, 463 (2009). See also John O. McGinnis, Constitutional
Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational
Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 298, 306 (1993).
95 Morrison, 437 U.S. at 688, 706 (Noting that the appellees and Justice Scalia held
prosecution to be an executive power); See also Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note
13, at 529; Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341, 383 (2010).
96 1 Cong. ch. 21, Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 93 (1789).
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authorized the Supreme Court to appoint an Attorney General and
authorized District Court judges to appoint marshals and district
attorneys for the United States (now U.S. Attorneys).97 Ellsworth was
a Senator from Connecticut who had been a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention and later became the second Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. 98 Indeed, of the nine members of the
committee drafting the Judiciary Act,99 six had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention.100 Although the final Act did not specify
who would appoint or direct the Attorney General or the district
attorneys,101 the President undertook to do so and no one objected.102
The final Act did not specify who appointed marshals in each district,
but it did authorize judges to remove them at pleasure.103 As enacted,
the Judiciary Act did not place these officials in an executive
department and did not provide the President or the Attorney
General 104 with supervisory power over prosecution by the district
attorneys, although they assumed such authority from time to time.105
The President requested legislation giving the Attorney General
supervisory control over district attorneys, but Congress did not enact
it. 106 Indeed, the Secretary of State assumed supervisory authority
over district attorneys from time to time.107

GOEBEL, supra note 79, at 490.
WILLIAM GARRETT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 118, 184–85, 238
(Da Capo Press 1970). Ellsworth did not sign the Constitution because he had to leave the
convention before its end to attend to his law practice. He served as Chief Justice from
1796-1800. Id.
99 GOEBEL, supra note 79, at 458.
100 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 79, at 609–19.
101 There is no indication of why the provision for appointment by the judiciary was
dropped or who was supposed to do the appointment. GOEBEL, supra note 79, at 501.
102 Beale, supra note 15, at 393; Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 552–
65.
103 1 Cong. ch. 20, Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 87 (1789).
104 The Act charged the attorney general with representing the United States in the
Supreme Court and acting as legal advisor to the President and heads of departments. 1
Stat. 93 (1789). Congress did not provide the Attorney General with supervisory authority
over U.S. Attorneys until the Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37 sec. 1, 12 Stat. 285 (1861), and
did not create the Department of Justice until the Act of June 27, 1870, ch. 150 sec. 1, 16
Stat. 162 (1870).
105 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 552–64.
106 Bloch, supra note 15, at 585–87.
107 GOEBEL, supra note 79, at 611–13.
97

98
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Congress in its first session included compensation for the
Attorney General in a statute establishing compensation for judges,108
rather than in the statute establishing compensation for executive
officers,109 and it repeated that pattern in its last session.110 It provided
for compensation of the district attorneys in the Judiciary Act itself.111
That compensation was not generous or indicative that the jobs were
full time; both the Attorney General and the district attorneys
supplemented their government income with private clients. 112 The
First Congress in its first session also adopted the Northwest
Ordinance enacted by the Confederacy Congress. 113 The Ordinance
provided an extensive list of officials to govern the Northwest
Territories, including a governor, judges, a legislative council, and a
secretary, but no prosecutors. 114 Of the two thousand federal
employees during the first administration, 115 only sixteen were
engaged in prosecution. 116 Federal prosecution was an afterthought
for the First Congress and at least some of its members were, at least
initially, ambivalent over whether federal prosecutors were executive
or judicial officials.
The First Congress assigned the district attorneys the “duty . . . to
prosecute . . . all delinquents for crimes and offenses, cognizable
under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which
the United States shall be concerned.”117 While this appears to grant
district attorneys exclusive authority to prosecute federal criminal and
civil cases, it did not. Both before and after Congress enacted the
Judiciary Act creating district attorney positions, it also enacted
statutes containing qui tam provisions authorizing private
1 Cong. ch. 18, sec. 1, Sept. 23, 1789, 1 Stat. 72 (1789).
1 Cong. ch. 13, sec. 1, Sept. 11, 1789, 1 Stat. 67 (1789).
110 1 Cong. ch. 22, sec. 1, March 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 216 (1789).
111 1 Cong. ch. 20, sec. 35, Sept 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 92-3 (1789).
112 GOEBEL, supra note 79, at 613, 726.
113 1 Cong. ch. 8, Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
114 Id.
115 Free Enterprise Fund, supra note 14, at 3168 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In September
2009, there were a total of 2.8 million civilian federal employees, of which approximately
113,495 were employed by the Department of Justice, about 4%. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS.
MGMT., FED. EMP’T STATISTICS, TABLE 2, 2009, http://www.opm.gov/feddata/html/2009
/September/table2.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
116 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15, The Attorney General, and one prosecutor for
each district. By the end of the first Congress there were fifteen districts, one for each of
the original 13 colonies and one each for newly admitted Kentucky and Vermont. 1 Cong.
ch. 4, Feb. 4, 1791, 1 Stat. 189 (1791); 1 Cong. ch. 7, Feb. 18, 1789, 1 Stat. 191 (1789).
117 1 Cong. ch. 20, sec. 35, Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (emphasis added).
108
109
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enforcement of federal law, initially of all federal law subject to
enforcement by federal district attorneys. 118 Moreover, Congress
conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts to assess forfeitures,
fines, and penalties for some revenue offenses, presumably in actions
brought by state or local prosecutors.119 To the extent that Congress
granted enforcement authority to private individuals in qui tam
provisions and prosecution authority to states in others, it could not
have intended federal district attorneys to have exclusive prosecution
authority against all violations, but only concurrent authority against
most violations.
Nothing in the Constitution even hints that it vested prosecution in
the executive branch. The Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses do
not mention prosecution, the remainder of Article II does not mention
prosecution, and the remainder of the Constitution does not mention
prosecution. Nothing in THE FEDERALIST even hints that prosecution
is a constitutional executive function; indeed it does not mention
prosecution. There is no evidence the framers of the Constitution
believed that prosecution was an executive power, let alone a
quintessential one. 120 Indeed, the most important English language
dictionary available at the time of the framing of the Constitution
does not mention prosecution in its definition of “executive.”121

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
3 Cong. ch. 45, sec. 10, June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 373, 375 (1794); 3 Cong. ch. 48, sec. 5,
June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 376, 378 (1794). Such actions were “dependent upon state officials in
executing federal laws,” presumably state prosecutors. Krent, supra note 15, at 304.
120 Notably, just because the executive does not hold all prosecutorial powers does not
mean that it is released from taking care that the laws be faithfully executed as demanded
by Art. II of the Constitution. For example, when signing the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act into law, the President issued a concurrent statement that § 214 of the
Act was merely advisory because it would “impermissibly interfere with the President’s
[sole] constitutional authority” to recognize foreign sovereigns. Presidential Statement on
Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1659
(Sept. 30, 2002). The Court of Appeals began its analysis of the issue by assuming that the
statute was constitutional, which, by avoidance of the constitutional issue, effectively
allowed the executive to selectively execute the law. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571
F.3d 1227, 1230 (C.A.D.C. 2009). When a branch of Government has at its disposal a
mechanism to guard against incursions on its powers, courts are not precluded from
adjudicating separation of powers claims and even routinely do so. Id. at 1238.
121 Definition of appointment, SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, Vol. 1 (1755), available at http://archive.org/stream/adictionaryengl00jame
goog#page/n278 /mode/2up (“1. Having the quality of executing or performing; active; not
deliberative; not legislative; having the power to put in act the laws”) (last visited Jan. 16,
2013).
118
119
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The complete lack of connection between prosecution and
executive power in the wording and history of the Constitution
suggests the framers of the Constitution had no intent to place
prosecution in the executive power. It most strongly suggests the
framers simply were not thinking of prosecution when they framed
the Constitution and wrote THE FEDERALIST because they did not
envision prosecution as a major federal function, executive or
otherwise. There could be several reasons for this. First, they
envisioned prosecution of traditional common law crimes as a state
rather than a federal function.122 Second, they conceived of state and
private parties performing many of the functions of federal
prosecution. 123 Third, they viewed prosecution of federal criminal
statutes as of limited importance, as they did not establish
punishments for common law crimes within federal jurisdiction until
its second session.124 Finally, there had been no prosecutorial function
under the Articles of Confederation.125
If the framers of the Constitution weren’t thinking of prosecution
when they gave executive power to the President, what could they
have had in mind by executive power? A review of the statutes
enacted during the first session of the First Congress indicates what
its members expected the President to do: collect duties on imported
goods; regulate coastal commerce; conduct relations with foreign
countries; repay states for funds loaned during and after the
revolution; administer the Northwest Territories; build and maintain
lighthouses, beacons, buoys and public piers; negotiate treaties with
Indian tribes; pay federal employees; maintain public records and
seals; collect taxes on distilled spirits; administer a postal system; pay

122 See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (“The only question
which this case presents is, whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a
common law jurisdiction in criminal cases . . . . Although this question is brought up now
for the first time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since
settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been
asserted; and the general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in
favor of the negative of the proposition.”) Id.
123 See infra Part IV.B.
124 See infra note 140. Even then, the list was modest and the length of the initial
criminal code was less than the statute on import duties Congress enacted in its first
session Compare infra note 145 with infra note 143. Moreover, every statute it enacted
during the first session with criminal sanctions also authorized qui tam actions. See infra
note 148, at 29.
125 The Continental Congress routinely requested that the states prosecute criminal acts
against federal interests. Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 576.
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pensions to invalid veterans; and provide for the national defense.126
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 defines the President’s powers and duties in
similar terms, making no mention of prosecution. 127 These
assignments all fit easily within the dictionary definitions of executive
activities cited above. While prosecution may have been of benefit to
some of these assignments, it was only ancillary to them, 128 as
demonstrated by the tiny fraction of federal employees devoted to
prosecution.129
B. Private Enforcement of Federal Law
Private enforcement was an established part of the AngloAmerican legal system at the time the Constitution was drafted and
ratified. Criminal prosecution in England was commonly
accomplished by private individuals prior to and at that time; 130
indeed, private prosecution remained common for English crimes
well into the second half of the nineteenth century 131 and is still

126 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE Vol. 1 xvii (1845), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=18
(last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
127 “The administration of government . . . falls peculiarly within the province of the
executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of
finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the
general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the
directions of the operations of war, these, and other matters of a like nature constitute what
seems to be most properly understood by the administration of government.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton). Prakash observes that compared to
prosecution, these are secondary aspects of execution of the law. Prakash, The Chief
Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 552. The tiny portion of federal employees devoted to
prosecution in comparison to the portion devoted to general administration suggests this
observation is implausible. See supra notes 112–13.
128 The statute on collecting duties on imported goods, for instance, provided for
penalties for various violations and authorized the customs collector to sue in the name of
the United States for penalties, fines, and forfeitures. The penalty provision, however, was
at the end of the statute and occupied only three of its forty-eight sections. Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, §§ 36–38, 1 Stat. 48-49 (1789).
129 See supra note 111.
130 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 128 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[P]rivate persons regularly prosecuted criminal cases.”); Krauss, supra note
15; Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 413 (2009).
131 See 1 James Fitzjames Stephen, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
495 (1883) (“Every private person has exactly the same right to institute any criminal
prosecution as the Attorney-General or any one else.”); see also Juan Cardenas, The Crime
Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 360–64 (1986).
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possible today. 132 Private prosecution carried over to the English
colonies in North America 133 and persisted in the new states to
varying degrees after the Constitution went into effect.134 The notion
that crimes could be prosecuted by private individuals at that time is
understandable, since most early crimes were common law crimes for
injuries to individuals and their property.135
Private participation in the prosecution of federal crimes continued
for some time. 136 Private citizens initiated criminal prosecutions by
obtaining warrants for the arrest of defendants and presented evidence
to grand juries to secure indictments of defendants. 137 Indeed, the
second Attorney General, William Bradford, in 1794 advised the
Secretary of State, on behalf of the British Consul in Norfolk, that a
private citizen could force a district attorney to act on a privately
obtained grand jury indictment, even though the district attorney had
previously decided not to prosecute.138
The qui tam139 action is a distinct form of private enforcement: a
statutory device authorizing private plaintiffs to sue of the sovereign
to collect monies owing the sovereign, including debts and penalties
for defrauding the sovereign. The statutes commonly provide for the
deposit of funds recovered by private enforcers in the public treasury,
with a percentage of the recovery going to the private plaintiff as a
reward for services rendered to the government.140 Qui tam actions
were common in England for centuries before the framing of the

132 Jonathan Rogers, Restructuring the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in England,
26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 777, 801–02 (2006). See the website of the Crown
Prosecution Service, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/ (the right
to prosecute privately is preserved, although the Crown Prosecution Service has the right
to take over or terminate a private prosecution) (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
133 See Cardenas, supra note 131, at 367–71; Fairfax, supra note 130, at 421.
134 Krent, supra note 15, at 291.
135 See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (establishing punishments for crimes
committed within federal jurisdictions, all of which were common law crimes).
136 See, e.g., Virginia v. Dulany, 28 F. Cas. 1223 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16, 959).
137 See Dangel, supra note 15, at 84; Krent, supra note 15, at 292.
138 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 42, 43 (1794). The episode is described in Krent, supra note 15, at
293–94.
139 Qui tam is short for a Latin phrase meaning “who pursues this action on our Lord
the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 527 for pejorative comments
that qui tam actions harness “private greed to enforce the law,” which seem out of place
since most of government enforcers that qui tam relators replaced, were paid in the same
way. See statutes cited infra notes 143–50.
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Constitution and had carried over to the English colonies in North
America. 141 The First Congress enacted several statutes authorizing
qui tam actions, 142 including statutes imposing duties on distilled
spirits, 143 establishing the first census, 144 specifying the punishment
for larceny,145 regulating trade with Indians,146 and harboring runaway
seamen. 147 Moreover, the First Congress enacted a set of statutes
granting bounties to informers whose information led to the recovery
of funds by the government, including statutes establishing duties on
imports,148 statutes prohibiting conflicts of interest by employees of
the Treasury Department,149 and statutes prohibiting improper acts by
employees of the Bank of the United States.150 Justice Scalia noted in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 151 that the Court had earlier
established that these informer statutes were the equivalent of qui tam
statutes: “[s]tatutes providing for a reward to informers which do not
specifically either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the
action are construed to authorize him to sue.” 152 The fact that the
amount awardable to informers, one half of the funds collected, was
commonly the same in both sets of statutes also suggests that
informers were able to prosecute under both sets of statutes.
Qui tam devices were not incidental enforcement provisions: the
First Congress employed them throughout the nascent law code. Their
host statutes occupy nearly half of the pages of statutes enacted by the

Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 774–78.
See id. at 776–66; Matthew S. Brockmeier, Pulling the Plug on Health Care Fraud:
The False Claims Act After Rockwell and Allison Engine, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
277, 279 (2009); Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by
the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 95 (1997);
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 571–80.
143 1 Cong. ch. 15, § 44, March 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (1791).
144 1 Cong. ch. 2, § 3, March 1, 1790, 1 Stat. 101, 102 (1790).
145 1 Cong. ch. 9, § 9, 16, 17, April 30, 1790, 1 Stat., 112, 116 (1790).
146 1 Cong. ch. 33, § 3, July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790).
147 1 Cong. ch. 2, § 1, 4, July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 131,133 (1790).
148 1 Cong. ch. 5, July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 38, 44–45, 48 (1789); 1 Cong. ch. 35, § 55,
69, Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat 173, 177 (1790); 1 Cong. ch. 11, § 21, Sept. 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 55,
60. (1789).
149 1 Cong. ch. 12, § 8, Sept. 2, 1789, 1 Stat 67 (1789); 1 Cong. ch. 8, § 1, Mar. 3,
1791, 1 Stat. 215 (1791).
150 1 Cong. ch. 10, § 8, 9, Feb. 25, 1791, 1 Stat. 191,195–96 (1791).
151 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777 n.7 (2000).
152 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943)).
141
142
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First Congress. 153 Every one of the statutes enacted by the First
Congress providing for government prosecution also provided for
private enforcement through qui tam provisions. 154 The remaining
statutes created no prosecutable offenses and therefore were not
susceptible to qui tam provisions.155
The prevalence of qui tam provisions no doubt reflects the paucity
of federal employees available to enforce federal laws at the time.156
Without adequate government enforcement personnel, the First
Congress had no choice but to rely heavily on familiar and common
private prosecutors. The fact that more than half of the members of
the First Congress were fresh from participation in drafting or
ratifying the Constitution157 creates a strong presumption that when
the First Congress enacted qui tam provisions in all enforceable
statutes, it believed private enforcement did not unconstitutionally
intrude on the executive power of the President. “[T]he interpretations

153 Over one hundred of the approximately two hundred pages of statutes enacted by
the First Congress. See 1 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 126, at 23–224
(1845), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsllink.html (follow “List of
Public Acts” hyperlink under “Volume 1: 1st-5th, 1789–1799”) (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
154 1 Stat. 23-225 (1789). See e.g. supra notes 143–50. Not all of the statutes provided a
qui tam remedy for every violation. For instance, the statute imposing penalties for
common law crimes within the jurisdiction of the federal government provided a qui tam
remedy only for larceny, presumably because it was the only common law crime involving
the possible recovery of funds from which a bounty could be paid. Supra note 135. The
statutes with the most extensive remedies for crimes against the government’s proprietary
interests, the collection of duties on imported goods and distilled spirits, had catchall
provisions applying qui tam remedies to all forfeitures, fines and penalties established
throughout those statutes. See supra notes 143, 148. The statute dealing with duties on
distilled spirits authorized the attorney for the United States to proceed by information (a
criminal procedure) and the qui tam plaintiff to proceed by a civil action in debt. See supra
note 143. Although the other statutes did not specify this difference, a similar distinction
makes sense under the other statutes.
155 For instance, the admission of North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Kentucky (10 statutes); appropriations, salaries and compensation (19 statutes);
lighthouses (5 statutes); dealing with the federal debt and accounting between states and
the federal government (7 statutes). See supra note 149.
156 GOEBEL, supra note 79.
157 See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960) (of the ninety-five members
of the First Congress, twenty had been delegates to the Philadelphia Convention that
drafted the Constitution); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724 (1986). Twentyseven additional members also had attended state ratifying conventions for a total of more
than 50% of the members of Congress having been involved in the adoption of the
Constitution. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515,
1524 (1986).
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of the Constitution by the First Congress are persuasive . . . .” 158
Indeed, there is no indication that any member of Congress, the
President, or the courts at the time objected to private enforcement or
believed it unconstitutionally intruded on the executive power of the
President. The implication of constitutionality is particularly strong
under the Appointments Clause because the First Congress spent
considerable time and attention at its outset determining whether the
President could remove the principal officer of the Department of
Foreign Affairs without the consent of the Senate and whether his
power to remove the Secretary was inherent in the his Appointments
Clause authority or had to be conferred by the Senate.159 Ultimately
deciding that the President’s removal power was inherent and not
subject to Senate approval, Congress addressed the removal of a
principal officer obliquely to avoid implying Congress had to
authorize removal by the President. 160 Because the First Congress
158 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992). See Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 283 (1991) (“[A]ctions
by Members of the First Congress provide weighty evidence on the Constitution’s
meaning.”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (“The actions of the First Congress
. . . are of course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means.” (citing Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1983))); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 412 (1928); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926). But see Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 726 n.27 (2005) (“The first Congress was-just as the present
Congress is-capable of passing unconstitutional legislation.”); see also Walz v. Tax
Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970); James T. Blanch, The Constitutionality
of the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 701, 719–23
(1993).
159 See generally 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 455–586 (Gales and Seaton, 1834). See also Siakrishna Prakash, New
Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2006) (providing detailed
analysis of this debate and its resolution). The attention given to the “Decision of 1789”
overshadows the more important lesson that the First Congress gives us about executive
power from the different language it used in the statutes establishing the Departments of
Foreign Relations and War, on one hand, and the Department of Treasury on the other
hand. The differences suggest executive control over the first two and shared executive
and legislative control over the latter—an altogether different picture than painted by the
unitarians. Lessig, supra note 15.
160 Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29 (“[A]n inferior officer, to be
appointed by the said principal officer . . . who, whenever the said principal officer shall
be removed from office by the President of the United States . . . shall . . . .”). In the
Decision of 1789, the First Congress struck language from bills creating the Foreign
Affairs, War, and Treasury Departments that would have provided for presidential removal
of the principal officers of those departments, making it clear that such power was
conferred on the President by Article II, not by statute. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 111–32;
Prakash, supra note 13; CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 35–36; Lessig & Sunstein,
supra, note 15, at 25–26; Bloch, supra note 15, at 573–76.
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devoted so much attention to the appointment and removal power, it
is unlikely it would simultaneously enact qui tam statutes that even
one member remotely thought violated the Appointments Clause with
nary a mention of the issue.
Currently, the primary qui tam statute is the False Claims Act (the
FCA), 161 authorizing private plaintiffs, styled relators, to sue in the
name of the United States to recover for the United States payments it
has made as a result of fraudulent claims and to recoup for the relators
up to thirty percent of the funds recovered.162 The statute was enacted
in 1863 to curb drastic abuse by contractors supplying goods to the
army during the Civil War. 163 The FCA includes a number of
provisions for the executive branch to override or control its qui tam
actions,164 while the qui tam actions created by the First Congress did
not. The FCA authorizes the United States to file recovery actions on
its own, which it often does, but over half of the recoveries under the
FCA have been in actions filed under its qui tam provisions165 and
they have recovered considerable funds for the Treasury, 166 Thus, qui
tam actions have proven to be as important in recovery of federal
payments induced by fraud as citizen suits have proven in enforcing
federal environmental laws. Nevertheless, as with citizen suits, the
Supreme Court has long been hostile to qui tam actions.167 Even so, a
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006).
Brockmeier, supra note 142, at 279–80.
163 Id. at 281–83.
164 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006). The DOJ can bring a suit in the first place,
foreclosing qui tam actions. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). When the qui tam relator files a
complaint, he serves the DOJ, not the defendant. The complaint remains under seal for at
least 60 days while the DOJ determines whether to intervene. Id. § 3730(b). If the
government intervenes, it assumes primary authority for prosecuting the suit. Id. §
3730(c)(1). It may settle or dismiss the case over the objection of the relator Id. §
3730(c)(2). It may also decide to pursue the case by alternative means. Id. § 3730(c)(5). If
the DOJ does not initially intervene, it can do so later and, in the meantime, can monitor
the development of the case by requesting to be served with copies of all pleadings and
discovery documents. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
165 Brockmeier, supra note 142, at 279.
166 Id. at 278. Qui tam actions recovered $15 billion from 1987–2005.
167 There is an extensive literature on qui tam provisions and Article II and Article III
attacks on them. See Brockmeier, supra note 142; Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the
Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939 (2002); Gilles, supra note 39; Hamer, supra note 142;
Blanch, supra note 158; Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99
YALE L.J. 341 (1989). Some of the judicial hostility to qui tam suits no doubt results from
suspicion they are subject to abuse. See Brockmeier, supra note 142, at 282–84; Hamer,
supra note 142, at 119; Blanch, supra note 158, at 757–58; Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v.
U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775 (2000).
161
162
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unanimous Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens,168 in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held
that qui tam relators have Article III standing to sue, based in large
part on the well established nature of qui tam actions when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified.169 “[T]his history [is] well nigh
conclusive with respect to the questions before us here: whether qui
tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’”170 Although the
history of qui tam “well nigh” decided the issue, Justice Scalia’s first
argument was that qui tam relators were partial assignees, 171
consistent with representational standing.172 He noted that the history
of qui tam actions was inconsistent with the Court’s latter day
conception that standing “exists only to redress or otherwise to protect
against injury to the complaining party.” 173 The relator, however,
seeks standing only to sue for injury to another party, the United
States. The assignee theory bridges this gap, as assignees stand in the
shoes of their assignors. In Justice Scalia’s words, history confirmed
the partial assignee theory.174
168 Although Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Souter joined,
the dissent focused on whether the FCA authorized suit against a state and the dissenters
agreed with the majority on the standing issue. Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. 765,
775, 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (the
Court has a long history of looking to the laws of England and the states at the time of the
framing of the Constitution to determine whether particular issues are “cognizable in the
courts”).
170 Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 777 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)). Indeed, one of the chief proponents of the unitary
executive theory concludes that the established character of qui tam actions before and at
the time of the Constitution and its repeated adoption by the First Congress make
arguments that it is unconstitutional “a little hard to stomach.” Prakash, The Chief
Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 577.
171 Justice Scalia does not explain what he means by “partial assignee.” The relator is
suing for all the debt the defendant owes the United States. Partial may signal assignment
of federal rights, exclusive of the rights the federal government has to sue states that
private parties lack under the 11th Amendment. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S.
at 773 n.4. It could signal assignment of the government’s proprietary rights as opposed to
its sovereign rights. Gilles, supra note 39, at 341–45.
172 Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 772. He also considered whether relators
might have representational standing as agents of the United States. Because the statute
authorized relators to sue for themselves as well as for the United States, the agency theory
did not entirely work. Id.
173 Id. at 771 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (emphasis omitted)).
174 Id. at 774, 778.
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Although Justice Scalia noted the Court did not consider or decide
whether the FCA’s qui tam provision unconstitutionally intruded on
the executive power conferred on the President by Article II,175 it is
difficult to see how or why this history would be any less “well nigh
conclusive” under Article II than under Article III, especially when
latter day concepts of standing are irrelevant to Article II analysis.176
Coupled with this, the complete absence from the historical record of
any suggestion the framers considered other types of private
enforcement of federal law to be unconstitutional and the prevalence
of private enforcement at the time of the Constitution should be “well
nigh conclusive” that the framers did not consider private
enforcement of the type authorized by citizen suit provisions to be
unconstitutional.177
Unitarians label all of this “scholarly revision[ism].”178 Although
they do not contest the historical record discussed here, they contend
it is irrelevant because it does not disprove either that from the
beginning the President controlled prosecution or that the Constitution
conferred power over prosecution on the President. 179 Neither this
article nor the so-called “revisionist scholars” suggest that once
Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 the President did not
appoint and exercise loose supervisory control over district attorneys
prosecuting for the United States. They suggest, however, that the
framers of the Constitution were not thinking of prosecution at all,
much less thinking of it as an executive function. What else could
explain why an important member of the Constitutional
Id. at 779.
Indeed, the dissenters commented that this history “is also sufficient to resolve the
Article II question.” Id. at 801. All courts of appeal considering the question have held that
the FCA does not violate Article II. See Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749
(5th Cir. 2001); U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032
(6th Cir. 1994); U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993); U.S. ex rel.
Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1993). For a
list of district court decisions to the same effect, see Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F.
Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
177 Again, building on this, the complete absence in the historical record of any
suggestion the framers considered prosecution to be an executive function and the
indications that at least some of them considered it not to be, is well neigh conclusive that
the Framers had no intent to place prosecution in a particular branch and certainly no
intent to make it exclusively an executive function or a quintessential executive function.
178 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 533 (referring to the works cited
supra note 15). While Part IV of this article goes beyond the contributions of those authors
in some respects, its consideration of the historical record is of the same nature and fits
within what Prakash considers revisionism.
179 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 536–39.
175
176
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Convention,180 while later in the Senate, drafted the initial version of
the Act to have the judiciary appoint the Attorney General and the
federal district attorneys? The conclusion that the framers did not
regard prosecution as a quintessential executive function doesn’t
disturb the status of prosecution as an executive function; it certainly
has come to be so today. But it does mean that prosecution is not a
core executive function. While unitarians insist that the Constitution
gives prosecutorial power to the President by vesting executive
powers with him and requiring that he faithfully execute the laws,181
that is circular reasoning, it assumes prosecution is an executive
function, while that is the very question under examination.
V
THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 provides that the President “shall
appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for [officials whose
appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate], and
which shall be established by Law; but Congress may by law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”
Do the citizen suit provisions provide for the appointment of
officers in contravention of the Appointments Clause? That depends
on the meaning of “appoint,” “appointment,” “officer,” and,
inferentially, “office.” The Constitution does not define any of these
terms. THE FEDERALIST and the debates at the Constitutional
Convention do not discuss their meanings.
The two major dictionaries that sandwich the framing and
ratification of the Constitution illuminate the meaning of the words at
that time. Noah Webster’s American Dictionary Of The English
Language defines “appointment” as, inter alia, a “designation to
office” or “[a]n allowance to a person; a salary or pension, as to a
public officer.” 182 Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary Of The English
Supra notes 96–97.
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 537–39.
182 Definition of appointment, 1828 EDITION OF WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,appointment (last
visited Jan. 16, 2013). Webster’s definition of “appoint” provides no further illumination.
180
181
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Language defines “appointment” as, inter alia, “[a]n allowance paid
to any man; commonly used of allowances to public officers.” 183
These definitions both suggest that in the context of the Appointments
Clause, “appointment” means designation of a person for a federal
office and that the federal office provides some sort of allowance or
remuneration.
The dictionaries’ definitions of “office” and “officer” reinforce and
refine these suggestions. Webster defines “office,” inter alia, as
“[d]uty or employment of a private nature”184 and “officer,” inter alia,
as “employment undertaken by commission or authority from
government or those who administer it” and a “person commissioned
or authorized to perform any public duty.” 185 The same definition
notes that officers may be “civil, military, or ecclesiastical” and that
[n]on-commissioned officers are nominated by their captain, and
appointed by the commanding officers of regiments.” 186 Similarly,
Johnson defines “office,” inter alia, as “a public charge or
employment” and “particular employment” and defines “officer,”
inter alia, as “a man employed by the publick.”187 The equation of
“office” with “employment” in both of these dictionaries reinforces
the suggestion that offices involve remuneration. And the equation of
“officer” with designation by the government, or those administering
it, together with the example of military offices, reinforces the
suggestion that the Appointments Clause deals with the designation
by a particular responsible government official of a particular person
to fill a particular government position, with appropriate
remuneration. The Court has deduced from a similar analysis that an
Appointments Clause “office is a public station, or employment,
Definition of appoint, 1828 EDITION OF WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,appoint (last visited Jan. 16,
2013).
183 Definition of appointment, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785), available at http://archive.org/stream/adictionaryengl00jame
goog#page/n541/mode/2up (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
184 Definition of office, 1828 EDITION OF WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,office (last visited Jan. 16,
2013).
185 Definition of officer, 1828 EDITION OF WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,officer (last visited Jan. 16,
2013).
186 Id.
187 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785),
available at http://archive.org/stream/adictionaryengl00jamegoog#page/n518/mode/2up
(last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
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conferred by the appointment of government. The term embraces the
ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.”188
Citizen suit provisions are not governed by the Appointments
Clause. They do not designate any particular person to any particular
office, and they do not authorize any particular government official or
entity to do so. Indeed, they do not create an office to which an officer
may be designated or appointed. No government official appoints
citizen suit plaintiffs. The government does not employ citizen suit
plaintiffs or confer a duty on them. The provisions do not confer any
tenure or duration on them. Moreover, the government does not
remunerate them for their services or provide them with other
emoluments. While courts may assess penalties against defendants in
citizen suits, defendants pay penalties to the United States Treasury,
not to the citizen suit plaintiffs. 189 Citizen suit provisions simply
create a cause of action and provide district courts with jurisdiction to
hear such actions.
The inapplicability of the Appointments Clause to citizen suit
provisions is further illustrated by statutes the Court has considered
for possible violation of the Appointments Clause. Each of the
statutes that have been considered for possible violation of the
Appointments Clause by the Court authorized a particular government
entity or official to appoint individuals to employment in particular
government offices that provided remuneration and imposed
particular duties.190 Again, citizen suit provisions are quite different
188 United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867) (involving the Sub-Treasury Act
in which Congress provided for the appointment of “officers” and finding a clerk to the
assistant treasurer of the United States and appointed by the assistant treasurer to be an
“officer”). See also United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
189 See Clean Air Act § 304(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012).
190 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010) (holding Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 violated the Appointments Clause by
creating a five member board and authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission to
appoint the members because they are Officers of the United States); Freytag v. Comm’r
of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (holding statute did not violate the
Appointments Clause by authorizing the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to appoint and
assign special trial judges because they are “inferior Officers”); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988) (holding statute authorizing a judicial panel to appoint a special
prosecutor did not violate the Appointments Clause because the prosecutor was an inferior
Officer); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 violated the Appointments Clause because it created a six member Federal
Election Commission and authorized the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House each to appoint two of the Commissioners, thus removing the power
of appointment from the President, heads of executive departments, or the Judiciary, and
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from these statutes because citizen suit provisions simply create a
cause of action and provide courts with jurisdiction to hear such
causes. Unlike statutes considered by the Court for possible violation
of the Appointments Clause, citizen suit provisions do not authorize a
government official or entity to appoint individuals to government
offices and employment. Finally, while the Court was concerned in its
decisions with whether the challenged statutes impaired a branch’s
ability to perform its constitutionally assigned functions, the Court
never found a statute to violate the Appointments Clause unless the
statute took from the President some or all of his constitutional
appointment power and retained in Congress itself some or all of that
power.191
If citizen suit provisions do not violate the specific terms of the
Appointments Clause, it could still be argued that only officers,
inferior officers, or employees of the United States have the
constitutional authority to bring civil actions to enforce against
violations of federal statutes. If so, citizen suit plaintiffs would not be
allowed to do so.192 Of course, neither the Appointments Clause, the
remainder of the Constitution, nor Supreme Court precedent establish
that prohibition. The prominence of qui tam actions during the
framing and ratification and in the First Congress suggest the
argument is without merit. In any event, the argument is based on the
Vesting Clause and the Faithful Execution Clause of Article II and is
addressed in Part VI.
VI
THE VESTING AND TAKE CARE CLAUSES
Articles I (legislative power) and II (executive power) have parallel
three stage structures: an initial clause vesting power; successive
transferring it to members of Congress); United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898)
(holding statute did not violate the Appointments Clause by authorizing the President to
appoint and fix the compensation for “vice [counsels]” without confirmation by the Senate
because they were not Officers of the United States due to their temporary and subordinate
nature); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (holding statute authorizing courts of
appeal to appoint supervisors of elections for representatives in Congress did not violate
Appointments Clause because the supervisors were inferior officers).
191 See Buckley, 242 U.S. 1.
192 Indeed, many statutes beyond the pollution control statutes authorize private parties
to enforce federal law. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617
(2012); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012).
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clauses governing election to and terms of office; and final clauses
granting specific powers. The initial Vesting Clauses in both are very
similar: I) “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress . . .”193 and II) “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President . . .” 194 The wordings of the third stage clauses granting
specific powers are virtually the same: I) “Congress shall have Power
To . . .”195 and II) “[t]he President shall have Power to . . .”196 In both
Articles, there are apparent redundancies if both the vesting and
granting clauses confer power. If the granting clauses confer all
power in Article I, there is no need for the vesting power; it is totally
redundant. If the Vesting Clause confers all power in Article II, there
is no need for the granting clauses; they are totally redundant. It may
be relevant that Article I confers a much longer list of powers on
Congress than Article II confers on the President.
Unitarians argue the presence of a limitation in the Vesting Clause
in Article I and the lack of a limitation in the Vesting Clause in
Article II signifies that the Constitution grants only limited legislative
power to the Congress, but grants unlimited executive power to the
President, necessitating a much smaller list of specific powers to be
conferred on the President. 197 This is too facile. The long list of
enumerated powers in the granting clauses of Article I also are the
dividing line the Constitution established between federal and state
power.198 The short list of granted executive powers in part reflects
the derivative nature of executive powers to execute whatever laws
Congress enacts. But why is the short list needed at all if the Vesting
Clause already confers all executive power?
A similar question arises regarding the relationship between the
Vesting Clause 199 and the Granting Clause, 200 requiring that the
President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Do the
Vesting Clause and the Faithful Execution Clause both confer
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
195 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
196 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
197 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 55.
198 See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010); John F. Manning, Federalism
and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003
(2009).
199 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
200 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
193
194
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executive power on the President? If so, are they redundant? If the
general Vesting Clause also vests power on the President, what power
is left for the Faithful Execution Clause to confer? The answer may
lie in Section 3, which mentions neither vesting nor power. Although
one of its five clauses appears to be a power,201 the other four describe
activities the President “shall” undertake,202 suggesting they are duties
rather than powers. In general, the difference may be that duties are
mandatory, while powers are discretionary. Thus, the Faithful
Execution Clause may be most easily read to place a duty on the
President in all of the actions he takes under powers conveyed on him
elsewhere, to take those actions in faithful conformity with the law.203
Alternatively, Daniel Webster argued the Vesting Clause confers
no power, but merely establishes that the executive power granted to
the President elsewhere in Article II is vested in only one person, 204
“a President” (emphasis added).205 That resonates with the focus of
the debate among the framers on whether the Constitution should
confer executive power on one executive, two or more executives, or
even an executive council.206 That would leave the Faithful Execution
Clause as one of the powers enumerated in Article II, establishing
both the duty and power of the President to faithfully execute the laws
of the land: the Constitution, treaties, and statutes. The concept of
executive power based on the Faithful Execution Clause is more
limited than one focusing on the Vesting Clause, because it is
confined to executing duties specified by Congress rather than having
possible “inherent” aspects of the executive function itself. This
interpretation, however, would read the Article II Vesting Clause as if
it was conditioned with “herein granted,” as the Article I Vesting
Clause is. It also fails to explain why Article I vests power in “a

201 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2, authorizing the President to convene and recess
Congress under particular circumstances.
202 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cls. 1, 3–5, providing that the President shall give
information to Congress, receive Ambassadors, faithfully execute the nation’s laws, and
commission officers of the country. The latter, although a “shall” clause, appears to be
more of a power than a duty.
203 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 61–70; Dangel, supra note 15, at 1077–88;
Caminker, supra note 167, at 356.
204 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 150–51 (1926). The majority opinion
discounted Webster’s argument, assuming that it deprived the Vesting Clause of meaning.
As explained above, however, it does not.
205 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
206 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Congress,” in the absence of a debate in the Constitutional
Convention about whether to have more than one legislature.
A final explanation for the Faithful Execution Clause is that it was
intended to make clear that the President did not have the prerogative
claimed by earlier English Kings to annul or not to enforce acts of
Parliament. 207 Under this interpretation, the clause neither grants a
power nor confers a duty on the President, rather it prohibits him from
exercising a royal prerogative.
If presidential power to execute the laws derives from the Faithful
Execution Clause rather than the Vesting Clause, the argument that
citizen suits do not intrude on executive functions is significantly
easier because the President’s authority to execute statutes is no
broader than the congressional enactments themselves, with whatever
caveats and limitations they include, for example, citizen suit
provisions. Unfortunately, the wording and history of the Constitution
do not further illuminate the interrelation of the Vesting and Faithful
Execution Clauses.208 While the Court has on occasion made off-hand
comments that the Faithful Execution Clause confers executive
authority209 or that the clause imposes a duty,210 it has not considered
at any depth the interrelationship between the two clauses or the
extent to which both confer power on the President.211 Because the

207 See Prakash, Executive Power, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 8, at 389, n.40.
The concept is fully developed by Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of
‘Unconstitutional’ Laws; Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865,
869–74 (1994).
208 Dangel, supra note 15, at 1071.
209 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“[T]he
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed . . . .” (emphasis added)).
210 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152
(2010) (“It is his responsibility to take care . . . .”) (emphasis added); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (The Executive “is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care
. . . .’” (emphasis added)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 658 (independent counsel
“does not interfere with the President’s . . . constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care
that the laws be faithfully executed’”(emphasis added)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138
(1976) (“[I]t is to the President . . . that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take
Care . . . .’” (emphasis added)); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 132 (1926) (The
President “is charged specifically to take care” and is “[R]esponsible under the
Constitution for the effective enforcement of the law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
211 Myers, 272 U.S. at 118, 137–39, 151 (outlining the views of Madison, Jefferson,
and Webster, on the relationship between the Vesting Clause and the Appointments Clause
but not considering the relationship between the Vesting Clause and the Take Care
Clause). Holmer, dissenting, considered the role of the Vesting Clause in relation to all of
the remaining clauses in sections 2 and 3, including the Take Care Clause. He agreed with
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argument that citizen suits do not interfere with the exercise of the
executive prosecution function is relatively easy if the power to
exercise that function is conferred by the Faithful Execution Clause,
this article proceeds on the assumption that it is conferred instead by
the Vesting Clause.
Several defenders of citizen suits from Vesting and Faithful
Execution Clause attacks circumvent this analysis entirely, arguing
that citizen suits do not intrude on executive power at all because
citizen suits protect private rights, not public rights.212 Their argument
turns the Scalia-developed Article III restrictions on citizen suit
standing into a defense of citizen suits under Article II. As long as
citizen suit plaintiffs have “individuated injur[ies],” 213 which they
must to have Article III standing, they are not suing to vindicate
public rights, the role of the executive, but to vindicate private rights,
the role of injured individuals. Thus, citizen suits are much like
private actions to abate public nuisances, long recognized as
legitimate actions. 214 Because that argument is articulated so well
elsewhere, there is no reason to repeat or expand on it here.
Formalists, their unitarian allies, and functionalists approach the
issue of whether a statute conferring citizen suit jurisdiction violates
separation of powers doctrine using quite different analyses.
Formalists, such as Justice Scalia dissenting in Morrison v. Olson, ask
only two questions about the contested statute. “(1) Is the conduct of a
criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide whether to
prosecute) the exercise of purely executive power? (2) [If so,] [d]oes
the statute deprive the President . . . of exclusive control over the
exercise of that power?”215 If the answer to both questions is positive,
the statute is unconstitutional. Unitarians would expand the
functionalist position by arguing that civil enforcement is on a par
with criminal enforcement in separation of powers analysis and that
the President cannot achieve his constitutional duty of assuring the

Webster that the Vesting Clause only indicated who exercised executive authority and that
the remaining clauses defined executive authority. Id. at 228–30 (Holmer, J., dissenting).
212 See Craig, supra note 8; Johnson, supra note 8; Sunstein, supra note 8.
213 Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. HES, 619 F.2d 252, 254
(3d Cir. 1980).
214 William H. Rodgers, Jr., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW at 112-13 (1994) (“To a surprising
degree, the legal history of the environment has been written by nuisance law”). This is
perhaps the reason that the earliest Article II attack on citizen suits focused on their
penalty component rather than their injunctive component. See Lewis, supra note 5.
215 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705.
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faithful execution of the law unless he has control over every civil and
criminal case enforcing the law. Functionalists, e.g., the majority in
Morrison v. Olson, first ask if prosecution is a core executive
function.216 If not, they next ask: 1) whether Congress had legitimate
goals for placing some prosecution functions outside of the executive
branch and 2) whether the President is still reasonably able to
accomplish his constitutional duties or, if not, whether the
accomplishment of the congressional goals outweighs the interference
with the executive’s constitutional functions. If the answer to either
question is positive, the statute is constitutional.
A. The Formalist Argument
The formalist argument that citizen suits are unconstitutional is
fairly straightforward. Article II vests all executive power in the
President. Criminal prosecution is a uniquely executive function
because of its importance in protecting the country’s sovereign
interests from treason and internal violence and because it has always
and everywhere been regarded as executive in nature. Congress may
not place the authority for criminal prosecution anywhere but in the
executive branch. Therefore, Congress’ authorization for citizens to
prosecute violations of the environmental statutes is unconstitutional.
Although Justice Scalia asked in his Morrison v. Olson dissent
whether prosecution217 is a “purely” executive power, he left no doubt
of his belief that it is a purely executive function. The majority
concluded that prosecution was an executive function only because
“in practice” criminal prosecution had long been conducted by the
executive. Justice Scalia rejected the majority conclusion:
In what other sense can one identify “the executive Power” that is
supposed to be vested in the President (unless it includes everything
the Executive Branch is given to do) except by reference to what
has always and everywhere—if conducted by government at all—
been conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and

216 See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 582. Prakash argues that civil
and criminal prosecution are on par for this analysis. Those who argue citizen suits are
unconstitutional necessarily adopt this view. See supra note 5.
217 His view of prosecution is not confined to presenting the government’s case at trial.
It explicitly includes investigation and impliedly includes a multitude of prosecutorial
discretionary choices, such as whether to initiate prosecutions, what offenses to charge,
what evidence to use, what plea bargains to bargain for and accept, etc. Morrison, 487
U.S. at 705.
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always by the executive. . . . Governmental investigation and
prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.218

Prosecution is an executive function because it has always and
everywhere been an executive function.219 Once prosecution is found
to be an executive power, he concludes it cannot be entrusted outside
the executive; the vesting power “does not mean some of the
executive power, but all of the executive power” is vested in the
President.220 Under this argument, citizen suits cannot constitutionally
usurp the executive prosecutorial function.
There is a strong and equally simple counterargument within the
formalist framework, even within Justice Scalia’s reasoning: citizen
suit actions are not criminal prosecutions. Morrison v. Olson was a
separation of powers challenge to a criminal statute and Justice Scalia
addressed it as such. Citizen suit provisions authorize private civil
enforcement and civil actions are not criminal prosecution. The First
Congress was aware of the difference between civil and criminal
enforcement when it authorized recovery of the same forfeitures, fines
and penalties by federal attorneys in criminal actions and by private
citizens in qui tam civil actions for debt. 221 Congress continued to
Id. at 706.
Id. Justice Scalia is demonstrably wrong in proclaiming that prosecution everywhere
and forever has been an executive function. Much of what is considered criminal
prosecution was a judicial function in the classical civil law model on continental Europe,
although it has evolved into executive and hybrid judicial/executive functions in many
modern European systems. See John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental
Criminal Procedure: ‘Myth’ and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978); Abraham S.
Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three ‘Inquisitorial’
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977). The classical continental
criminal procedure was inquisitional in that a judge conducted the investigative as well as
the adjudicative and sentencing phases of a criminal case. Although reforms began in
many continental systems in the early 1800s, Latin American countries kept the older
system. See Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 363, 370–71 (2010); Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin
American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 617, 627–30 (2007). It is curious that Justice Scalia should emphatically
proclaim that prosecution was always and everywhere an executive function, when his
own decisions clearly referred to American colonial court procedures including “private
judicial examination.” Civil law prosecution “condones examination in private by judicial
officers,” and proclaimed “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure.” Moreover, prosecution has been
and remains an independent function in many states in which attorneys general and district
attorneys are elected officials and do not report to the chief executive of the state or
county. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43, 47–48, 50 (2004).
220 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705.
221 Supra note 132.
218
219
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authorize dual federal attorney criminal actions and private citizen
civil actions for the same violations of federal law and continues to do
so today, both in private civil qui tam actions 222 and citizen suit
enforcement, 223 and in parallel criminal prosecutions by federal
prosecutors. 224 There is need for greater executive control over
criminal than over civil prosecution because criminal prosecution
alone can deprive defendants of their life and liberty, which the Bill
of Rights recognizes by granting more individual liberties in criminal
than in civil prosecutions,225 even when civil sanctions appear to be
punitive.226
There is a secondary formalist argument that private civil
enforcement of environmental statute violations interferes with the
President’s prosecutorial ability to carry out his duty to see that those
statutes are faithfully enforced, either by removing particular
violations from his purview or by resulting in a bad precedent. The
simple answer is that the filing of a civil citizen suit against a
particular environmental offense does not remove that violation from
the President’s purview; the executive may still commence and
prosecute a criminal action for the same offense. 227 Moreover, the
executive may bar the private action entirely by first commencing a
federal civil action against the violation.228 Additionally, the executive
may intervene in the civil action229 and pursue its case there or seek a
stay until it has completed a criminal or other action of its choice.230
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012).
224 False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 286–287 and 1001–02 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7613(c) (2012).
225 See U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VIII.
226 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (Noting that although civil penalties
are the same as criminal fines in all but name, the Court honors the name Congress gives
them in determining whether to apply constitutional protections in criminal prosecutions);
see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997).
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (2012). The government may pursue civil and criminal
actions at the same time or successively. See S.E.C. v. Novaferon Labs, Inc., No. 91-3102,
1991 WL 158757 (6th Cir. 1991). EPA has a guidance document for its enforcement
officials to conduct such proceedings. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS POLICY, (Sept. 24, 2007). If the government itself can conduct
simultaneous or successive enforcement actions, there is no reason it cannot do so with
citizen suits.
228 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012).
229 Id. § 7604(b)(c)(2).
230 S.E.C. v. Nicholas, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which has its own civil litigation authority, commenced the
222
223

DORNER (DO NOT DELETE)

444

4/5/2013 9:55 AM

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 27, 401

B. The Unitarian Argument
The unitarian argument expands the formalist approach from
focusing on criminal prosecution to encompassing all enforcement
authorities available to the executive. 231 This broader focus derives
from the President’s duty to take care to faithfully execute the laws,
which is not confined to criminal prosecution. Faithful execution
includes assuring that enforcement is uniform, consistent and fair
across the country. Uniformity and consistency mean using the same
remedy and exacting the same sanctions for similar violations.
Fairness means using the remedy and exacting the sanction
appropriate to each violation, which sometimes means no remedy or
sanction. Almost by definition, citizen enforcement cannot always be
consistent with executive enforcement and cannot always use the
appropriate remedy, because the executive has a broader range of
remedies and sanctions than the injunctive relief and civil penalties
available to citizens.232 Moreover, while citizen suits might be very
useful in augmenting the executive’s admittedly limited enforcement
resources, the President cannot assure faithful execution of the law
when a multitude of private parties can bring civil actions for
injunctions and penalties free from presidential control. In particular,
when citizen plaintiffs may file actions at will, the President cannot
prevent prosecution of the innocent, collusive prosecution, or
prosecution against cooperative violators. 233 However, if the
executive could terminate private enforcement when it was
inconsistent with the executive’s enforcement policy, it would be
within his control and would be constitutional. 234 This is a more
complex and sophisticated argument, making the counter argument
correspondingly more complicated.
Unitarians argue that from the beginning of the country both
criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws have been entrusted to
civil action and the U.S. Attorney successfully moved, without opposition by the SEC, to
intervene and for stay of the civil proceeding pending completion of his pending criminal
action).
231 See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 540.
232 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2012) (Executive may at least prosecute criminally);
42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2012) (Executive may debar from government contracts and grants); 42
U.S.C. § 7413(a) & (d) (2012) (Executive may issue administrative compliance and
penalty orders or the Executive may issue informal warnings. The Executive may also do
nothing).
233 These seem to be particular fears for Prakash. Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra
note 13, at 580, 589.
234 See id. at 578, 583.
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the executive. The Faithful Execution Clause does not differentiate
between criminal and civil enforcement. The Judiciary Act of 1789
authorized federal district attorneys to prosecute all criminal and civil
matters before the district courts.235 On the other hand, as we have
seen, the Judiciary Act did not place either criminal or civil
enforcement solely in the executive branch, but shared them with
private citizens and states.236 Moreover, insofar as both the Court and
commentators have regarded enforcement as being a core executive
power, they have emphasized criminal, as opposed to civil,
enforcement.237
The notion that faithful execution of the law includes uniform,
consistent, and fair enforcement has an equal protection ring to it and
alludes to the very purpose of separation of powers doctrine: the
prevention of tyranny. Although undesirable, however, irregular,
inconsistent, and unfair enforcement is tyrannical only at its extremes.
Moreover, equal protection is embedded in the Bill of Rights, not in
the Constitution as ratified, with its notion of separation of powers.
There is nothing in the Faithful Execution Clause or its history
suggesting it requires uniform, consistent, and fair enforcement.
Indeed, when unitarians propound that proposition, they cite no
authority for it. As a practical matter, we all know that enforcement is
not, never has been, and probably never will be uniform and
consistent. There are not enough enforcement resources to achieve
uniform enforcement, and federal enforcement is too decentralized to
assure consistency. Indeed, the Supreme Court does not view
prosecution to be unconstitutional because it is inconsistent or even
selective except in the most extreme instances, when it runs afoul of
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Faithful Execution Clause. 238

See supra note 111.
See supra note 112.
237 Justice Scalia began the inquiry in his dissent to Morrison v. Olson by asking, “Is
the conduct of a criminal prosecution . . . the exercise of purely executive power?” 487
U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (emphasis added). He concluded it was. Riley v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 755–56 (5th Cir. 2001).
238 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 602–03, 608 (1985). (holding the defendant
must prove not only that he was the victim of disparate treatment, but also that the
disparate treatment was the result of an improper motive, such as race, religion or other
improper classification). In Wayte, the defendant proved that he was one of only thirteen
out of more than half a million indicted for failure to register for the draft. Without proving
an improper motive for his prosecution, however, he did not establish an unconstitutional
prosecution. Id.
235
236
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Outside of these extreme cases, the Court regards inconsistency as
part of the prosecutorial discretion inherent in the executive’s
powers.239
Fairness is somewhat in the eyes of the beholder, and few
defendants in enforcement actions acknowledge the fairness of the
sanctions imposed on them. In any event, the judiciary and the jury
are the ultimate insurers of fairness, not the executive. The most
pronounced case of the potential unfairness of private enforcement
discussed by the unitarians is prosecution of the innocent. 240 Of
course, we know that executive supervision does not prevent
occasional prosecution of the innocent by federal prosecutors, and
that the ultimate protections of the innocent, again, are the judiciary
and jury. Civil prosecution of the innocent, of course, smacks less of
tyranny than criminal prosecution of the innocent. Even so, unitarians
cite no instances of citizen suits against the innocent, nor do other
citizen suit critics. Citizen suits against innocent members of the
regulated public are extremely unlikely for two reasons. First, citizen
plaintiffs usually rely on data generated by defendants and reported to
the government for proof of violation; 241 such data are virtual
admissions by the defendants that they are not innocent. Second, if
courts find defendants innocent, they will not sanction the defendants.
Moreover, they will deny plaintiffs’ motions for attorney fees, and
they may grant defendants’ motions against plaintiffs for attorney
fees. They may even impose sanctions on the plaintiffs and their
attorneys under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
encourages plaintiffs’ attorneys in citizen suit cases to take care not to
file complaints against an innocent defendant or for harassment
purposes, for if they do so, they will be uncompensated for their legal
services and may be liable for the defendants’ attorney fees or even
worse sanctions.242
239 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 289–90, 306–07 (1987); Wayte, 470 U.S. at
602–03; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).
240 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 539, 580, 589, 595–96.
241 Roy S. Belden, Preparing for the Onslaught of Clean Air Act Citizen Suits: A
Review of Strategies and Defenses, 1 ENVTL. LAW 377, 383–84, 389 (1995) (noting that
citizen plaintiffs routinely use discharge monitoring reports filed by defendants with EPA
as prima facie evidence of violations of the Clean Water Act, and predicting the same
practice will emerge under the then newly amended Clean Air Act).
242 Caminker, supra note 167, at 373–74 (concluding, for many of the same reasons,
that “civil qui tam actions pose no greater risk of oppressive law enforcement than do the
vast array of privately prosecuted civil enforcement actions routinely initiated by selfinterested plaintiffs to vindicate their own rights.”).
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Unitarians are particularly concerned that the executive cannot
assure faithful execution of the laws because citizen suits may be
collusive.243 Again, neither the unitarians nor other critics of citizen
suits cite examples of collusive citizen suits. Ironically, the only
collusive suits on record are between states and defendants calculated
to bar citizen suits against the defendants.244
Unitarians245 and even the Court246 are concerned that citizen suits
may make it more difficult for the executive to negotiate settlements
with violators if citizens can later sue the violators for the same
violations. Their favorite example is a settlement, accomplished by
unspecified means, in which the violator agrees with the government
to provide more pollution reduction than required by law in return for
the government not seeking penalties for past violations. If citizens
can sue such a violator, critics say it is not only unfair to the violator,
but it will make other violators weary about making such deals with
the government. The easy answer to this problem is that the
government and the violator can completely bar a subsequent citizen
suit by the simple expedient of embodying their agreement in a
consent decree and entering it in court.247
All of the situations unitarians raise are theoretically possible, but
if they ever occur, they are not frequent occurrences. If they were,
unitarians and other critics of citizen suits would cite them. Indeed, if
they significantly interfered with or prevented the executive’s ability
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 589.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000).
245 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 589.
246 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60–61
(1987). The Court’s example did not justify its decision that the CWA’s citizen suit
provision authorized suit only against on-going violations, not wholly past violation. A
citizen suit will not interfere with a government action regarding a wholly past violation
any more than it will interfere with a government action regarding an on-going violation.
There are several other problems with the conclusions the Court drew from this example.
See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory Bars in
Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 488–90 (2004).
247 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012). Even so, a citizen suit in this situation does not
interfere with the government’s enforcement discretion. The citizen suit does not prevent
the government from making its enforcement choice or getting the benefits the
government expected from it: the government has already made its choice and
accomplished its goals. The citizen suit may frustrate the violator’s goals, but separation of
powers primarily protects the executive’s power to faithfully execute the laws, not the
violator’s pocketbook.
243
244

DORNER (DO NOT DELETE)

448

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

4/5/2013 9:55 AM

[Vol. 27, 401

to perform its constitutional duty to faithfully enforce the
environmental laws, at least one of the Presidents from Nixon to
Obama, their Attorneys General, their Administrators of EPA, or the
chief enforcers of environmental law at DOJ or EPA would have said
so. Yet they have not. Instead, the executive supported the inclusion
of citizen suit provisions in the CAA and the Clean Water Act.248 The
President signed the CAA without objecting to—or even
mentioning—citizen suits. When President Nixon vetoed the CWA, he
did so as a budget buster for its authorization of billions of dollars to
construct sewage treatment plants, without mentioning its citizen suit
provision. 249 The executive branch has frequently supported citizen
suits and citizen suit provisions in briefs filed with the Supreme
Court. 250 EPA’s enforcement office acknowledges that citizen
enforcement extends the effectiveness and augments the deterrent

248 Sen. Comm. On Public Works, 93rd Cong., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, p. 211. 214, letter from Nixon administration to
Sen. Jennings Randolph, Chair Senate Committee on Public Works, “[W]e do not object to
its [the citizen suit provision’s] enactment. Such suits can contribute to the effective
enforcement of air pollution control measures.” Sen. Comm. On Public Works, 95th
Cong., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, p. 1179, 1206, letter from the Nixon Administration to John A.
Blatnik, Chair House Committee on Public Works, “We generally agree with the
provisions of section 505,” although suggesting the deletion of 505(b)(B).
249 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON 1970, Item 552, pp. 990–93 &
1972, Item 485, pp. 1166–68. It is within the power of the Judiciary to decide the
constitutionality of a statute. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012) (quoting
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983)) (addressing the power of the courts to
decide the constitutionality of § 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act). All three
branches have duties to interpret and uphold the Constitution, but the Judiciary has the
final word on the constitutionality of a statute. The Constitution requires both the President
and members of Congress to take an oath of office, including support of the Constitution,
requiring them to make their best efforts to determine if proposed legislation is
constitutional and to not support unconstitutional legislation. Congress does not enact
statutes it believes to be unconstitutional and the President does not sign statutes he/she
believes to be unconstitutional. Both Congress and the President may believe a statute to
be constitutional, but the Judiciary may disagree and its opinion on the matter trumps the
other two branches. If either of the political branches believes a law to be unconstitutional,
then, presumably, it will never become law and will never face judicial discretion. Id.
250 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (No. 96-643) 1997 WL 348166; Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), (No. 86-473) 1987 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis
369; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981), (No. 79-408) 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 2324; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), (No. 98-822) 1999 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 652.
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value of its own limited enforcement resources.251 The Court should
not rule that citizen suits unconstitutionally prevent the executive
from faithfully executing the laws when such interference is
theoretical, not real, when the executive can prevent theoretical
interference by citizen suits, and when the executive does not believe
citizen suits interfere with its faithful execution of the laws.252
Unitarians concede that if the President can terminate private
enforcement actions, the President can control the actions, and they
are constitutional.253 Doing so solves the troubling unitarian problem
of reconciling the historically-based unitary executive theory that the
executive controls and always has controlled all prosecution with the
historical fact that statutory qui tam provisions were common both
before and after the Constitution and at that time contained no
authority for the executive to override private qui tam actions. The
unitarians postulate that the President could nevertheless terminate the
actions by use of his constitutional power to pardon254 or by the use of
the ancient writ of nolle prosequi.255 If that is true, the President can
similarly terminate citizen suits and they suddenly have no Article II
barriers, at least not for the unitarians.256
C. The Functionalist Argument
In the enforcement of environmental and other regulatory
programs, functionalists conceive of the Faithful Execution Clause in
a fundamentally different way than formalists and unitarians.
See Hodas, supra note 35, at 1576 n.121.
See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977). The fact that neither
President Ford nor President Carter supported former President Nixon’s claim that the
release of his presidential papers would intrude on the executive function detracted from
the weight of his claim. But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010).
253 See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 578.
254 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
255 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 579.
256 Id. Unfortunately, it is not so easy. First, the unitarians cite no precedents in which
presidential pardon or nolle prosequi were used to terminate a qui tam action and they cite
no authority from the constitutional period that pardon or nolle prosequi could be so used.
Id. at 587, 590. “We do not know how many federal prosecutions were brought in the early
years. Nor do we know what portion of these were popular actions. . . . [W]e do not know
whether early presidents ever terminated (or unsuccessfully sought to terminate) popular
prosecutions.” Id. at 587. Second, it’s not clear that a pardon erases civil, as opposed to
criminal, liability. Id. Third, it’s not clear that nolle prosequi is or ever was available for
this purpose in the United States. Id.
251
252
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Functionalists view faithful execution as developing standards that
meet the statutory requirements, establishing regulatory mechanisms
to achieve those standards, and assuring compliance by the regulated
public with the regulatory programs, often by enforcement actions
against violators. The President faithfully executes the law when he
accomplishes all of these activities, to achieve the statutorily
mandated level of protection for the public, whether a level of air
pollution or of other social goals. The measure of faithful execution in
enforcement for formalists and unitarians is fairness to violators of the
statute, while the measure of faithful execution for functionalist is
fairness to the public protected by the statute.
Functionalists understand that the executive never has enough
resources to enforce against all significant violators to achieve
congressionally mandated goals—safe levels of air pollution, for
example—and would allow private enforcement to help achieve
congressional objectives, as long as citizen enforcement does not
aggrandize Congress’ own power and does not prevent the President
from carrying out his own constitutional functions. If the President
lacks sufficient resources to faithfully enforce air pollution or other
laws to achieve their public welfare objectives, citizen enforcement
helps the President achieve his duty and does not hinder him from
doing so.
The functionalist argument begins by analyzing separation of
powers differences between criminal prosecution and civil
enforcement, with criminal prosecution powers being more central to
the executive than civil enforcement powers.257 That flows from the
purpose of separation of powers to protect the people from tyranny, a
purpose served by diffusing among all three branches a power that
can adversely affect citizens, such as the power to prosecute
criminally. Thus, prosecution requires action by all three branches:
the legislature to enact a criminal statute, the executive to prosecute a
defendant, and the judiciary to convict the defendant. Protection from
tyranny is more important to defendants in criminal than in civil
prosecution because only criminal conviction can deprive them of life
and liberty.
The Court in Heckler v. Chaney258 identified the similarities and
differences between civil and criminal prosecution. In both, “an
agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce . . . is a decision
257
258

See supra note 216.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”259 In short,
the decision is not subject to judicial review. However, the decisions
not to institute civil and criminal actions are similar only “to some
extent,” 260 because the reasons they are generally not subject to
judicial review are wholly different. The lack of judicial review of
decisions not to indict criminally is grounded on separation of powers
and the Faithful Execution Clause.261 Judicial review of an agency’s
decisions not to enforce civilly or administratively, however, is based
on the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act.262 These provisions make final agency actions subject to judicial
review, except when they are “committed to agency discretion by
law.” 263 One talisman of discretion is the absence in a statute of
criteria for agency decision-making, giving no law for courts to apply
in judicial review. Civil enforcement provisions in statutes are
typically silent on when agencies should or should not enforce.
The Court in Heckler v. Chaney carefully pointed out that a
decision not to enforce civilly “is only presumptively unreviewable”
because Congress may provide enforcement guidelines, establish
enforcement priorities, or “circumscrib[e] an agency’s power to
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”264 Moreover, an
agency’s decisions not to enforce may be “so extreme” they may be
an abdication of responsibility, not committed to its discretion. 265
Thus the Court recognizes that Congress has considerable latitude in
structuring the executive’s civil and administrative enforcement
programs and decisions. The lesser constitutional centrality of civil
enforcement to executive power is reflected in the congressional
creation of the independent agencies that engage in a range of civil
enforcement although they are removed to varying extents, and
sometimes almost completely, from executive control. 266
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
261 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). The constitutional provision referenced by
Rehnquist in Heckler, commonly referred to as the “Faithful Execution Clause” or “Take
Care Clause,” states that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” Id.
262 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
263 Id. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
264 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833.
265 Id. at 833 n.4.
266 See Glicksman, supra note 11, at 11,006–07; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15, at
106–11; Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 530–31, 573–74.
259
260
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Supplementing the executive’s civil enforcement capabilities with
citizen suits is a far less drastic encroachment on the executive’s
prosecutorial power than placing enforcement powers in independent
agencies.267
With that background, functionalists would ask, does the
Constitution explicitly vest the prosecution function in the President?
If not, do the citizen suit provisions aggrandize the power of
Congress? If not, do citizen suits prevent or interfere with the
President’s performance of his constitutional powers or his ability to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed? If not, citizen suits are
free from Article II impediments. If they do interfere with the
executive’s performance of its duty, do citizen suits help Congress
achieve an important goal and, if so, does that goal outweigh their
interference with the President’s performance of his powers and
duties?268 If so, citizen suits are also free from Article II impediment.
The Constitution does not explicitly vest prosecution with the
President, although he performs that function and we have come to
regard it as an executive function. Because the Constitution does not
specifically vest prosecution, it is not a core executive function.
Citizen suits do not aggrandize the power of Congress. While they
make it more likely that Congress’ legislative goals will be achieved,
they give neither Congress, nor its members, nor its subordinates one
iota of power. While citizen suits may have some effect on the
President’s performance of his prosecutorial functions, that effect is
minimal. Once we have developed a more detailed understanding of
citizen suits on executive action, we can balance the benefits of
citizen suits against any such negative effect.
It is also important to query whether citizen suits prevent or
interfere with the executive’s performance of its prosecutorial
functions. The prosecutorial function involves a whole range of
prosecutorial decisions, including the decision to investigate, 269 the
decision to prosecute, 270 what charges to bring, 271 when to bring

267 Some unitarians argue there are no distinctions in executive discretion to make civil
and criminal enforcement decisions, although they build their case for executive discretion
on criminal examples. See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 540.
268 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851, 856–57
(1986); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
269 See United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799, 824–25 (4th Cir. 1998).
270 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
271 See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997).
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them, 272 where to bring them, 273 whether to grant immunity, 274 and
whether to negotiate or agree to a plea bargain.275 The Court reached
these decisions in criminal cases and prosecutorial discretion is
normally thought of as a function of criminal prosecution. But in
regulatory programs, the executive has discretion whether to enforce
in a criminal action, a civil action, or an administrative action. Within
civil and administrative enforcement, the executive has a range of
discretion similar to that he has in criminal prosecution. As the Court
commented in Heckler v. Chaney, with regard to administrative
enforcement:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation
has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits
the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all.276

Many, if not most, discretionary prosecution decisions, whether in
the context of criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement, involve
resource allocation, policy, strategy, or a combination of them. When
a citizen sues a violator who the executive has not enforced against,
the reason why the executive has not enforced is critical to whether
the citizen suit potentially interferes with the executive’s faithful
execution of the law. If the executive has not enforced against the
violator because of the executive’s resource allocation, it is difficult
to see how the citizen suit interferes with the executive’s faithful
execution. Perhaps this is easiest to understand in the extreme case in
which Congress has appropriated no funds for the executive to
enforce a particular statute, but has authorized citizen enforcement.
The executive cannot use resources from another appropriation to
enforce against violations of that statute. For a government official to
do so would be a criminal offense.277 A citizen enforcement action
against such a violation can hardly interfere with executive

272
273
274
275
276
277

See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 792 (1977).
See United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 873 (3d Cir. 1992).
See United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
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prosecutorial discretion, for the executive can take no action. Of
course, most cases are not this stark. But while the executive may
have considerable resources to enforce against violations of a
particular statute, it rarely has enough to enforce against all
significant violations. It must then allocate its resources to achieve the
best compliance and environmental results for the resources
expended. This will involve prioritizing the violations enforced
against, often reflecting the environmental impact of the violations,
and the type of enforcement action to take, often reflecting the
executive resources required by different actions.278 A citizen action
against a violation for which the executive lacks the resources to
pursue on its own can hardly interfere either with the executive’s
allocation of its own resources or with its prosecutorial discretion.279
While a citizen suit, of course, can interfere with the executive’s
policy choices or strategy in a particular case, it is important to
remember that the President has no absolute power to control all
aspects of even criminal prosecution. 280 Even so, the citizen suit
provisions authorize the executive to protect its policy and strategy
choices in a number of ways. The first is to file and diligently pursue
a civil action, barring the subsequent filing of a citizen suit.281 If the
executive cannot move fast enough to cut off the citizen suit at the
outset, it can file a subsequent suit and move to consolidate the citizen
suit282 or intervene in the citizen suit by right.283 If the executive does
not wish to intervene, it can file an amicus brief on contested issues of
law. If the citizen plaintiff and the defendant settle the case, as almost
all do, the consent decree cannot be entered until it has been served on

278 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, THE ENFORCEMENT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM
(CLEAN WATER ACT) (1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources
/policies/civil/cwa/emscwa-jensen-rpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
279 See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 13, at 495. (acknowledging the
President cannot “cast aside” private enforcement assistance because he would prefer
Congress allocate resources differently).
280 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988).
281 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012).
282 While citizen suit provisions bar citizen suits when the government has commenced
and is diligently pursuing a civil action, e.g., 42 U.S.C § 7604(b)(1)(B), neither the citizen
suit provisions nor the EPA enforcement provisions, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413, bar an EPA
action when a citizen has commenced a citizen suit.
283 Id. § 7604(c)(2).
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the executive and he has had an opportunity to comment on it or to
intervene to oppose it.284
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held that the executive retained
sufficient control over the special prosecutor appointed under the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 285 to avoid unconstitutional
interference with the executive’s faithful execution of the laws
because 1) no special prosecutor could be appointed until the
Attorney General had investigated the matter and concluded that a
special prosecutor should be appointed for a particular potential
defendant; 286 2) the special prosecutor was required to follow DOJ
“policy unless it [was] not ‘possible’ to do so;”287 and 3) the Attorney
General could remove the special prosecutor for good cause.288 This
gave the Attorney General some control over the initiation of the
special prosecutor’s investigation, some control over the special
prosecutor’s investigation and prosecution, and the ability to
terminate the special prosecutor for cause. The Court did not hold that
only this combination of executive controls would allow the executive
to faithfully execute the laws when Congress entrusted prosecution
powers to others, but that it was sufficient for the particular statute in
question. Indeed, this set of controls might not be appropriate or even
possible for other situations, such as citizen suits. Nonetheless, the
executive controls under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 can
be compared to the executive controls under citizen suits as a point of
reference.
Comparing citizen suits to special prosecutions demonstrates that
executive controls over citizen suits, although different, are as great or
greater than those over special prosecutions even though citizen suits
are civil, thereby warranting less controls than special prosecutions
Id. § 7604(c)(3).
28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 (2012).
286 The Attorney General did not have complete discretion in the matter, however. If he
received information that a person covered by the statute had committed a crime, he was
required to conduct an investigation and, within ninety days to report the result to a special
court. If he determined “there [were] no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation is warranted,” he was required to report that to the special court, but it had no
authority to appoint a special prosecutor. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 661 (1988)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)). If the Attorney General concluded there were reasonable
grounds to believe further investigation was warranted, however, he was required to report
that to the court and it was required to appoint a special prosecutor. Id. at 660–61, 696.
287 Id. at 696; 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (2012).
288 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2012).
284
285

DORNER (DO NOT DELETE)

456

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

4/5/2013 9:55 AM

[Vol. 27, 401

that are criminal. At the initiation stage, the executive must make a
positive finding that triggers the appointment of a special prosecutor
and there is no judicial review available for a negative finding. In
theory, the executive thereby has complete control over whether a
special prosecutor is appointed, while it has no control over whether a
citizen will initiate a private enforcement action.
How much control does a negative finding give the executive?
These incidents play out in the media and the public eye. To make a
negative finding in the face of publicly known evidence of
wrongdoing is virtually an admission of corruption. On the other
hand, potential citizen plaintiffs must notify the executive of their
intent to commence citizen suits and the executive can completely bar
a citizen suit by initiating and diligently pursuing its own enforcement
action. The executive’s control over special prosecutions at this stage
is theoretically stronger, but in reality, it is stronger over citizen suits.
During the supervision stage, the executive binds the special
prosecutor with the terms of the referral and the policies of DOJ. But
the executive may intervene by right in citizen suits, playing a role
thereafter in its prosecution, perhaps the dominant role given the
greater resources of the government and its greater credibility before
the judge.
Alternatively, the executive could begin its own civil action and
move to consolidate the citizen suit, placing the executive in the
dominant position among plaintiffs. If the executive does not
intervene, he may review any proposed settlement and comment on it
to the judge or even intervene by right to oppose its entry. During the
supervision stage, the executive’s controls over citizen suits are
overwhelmingly stronger than over special prosecutions. At the
termination stage, the executive may remove the special prosecutor by
right, although the grounds for removal are narrow and removal will
not end the prosecution because the judicial committee will
presumably appoint a new special prosecutor to continue the
investigation and prosecution. The executive has no means to
terminate a citizen plaintiff, although he has several means, described
above, to prevent or in varying degrees to control a citizen suit and its
ultimate disposition. The executive’s control over the disposition of
citizen suits, although indirect, is stronger than over special
prosecutions.
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act (CAA) citizen suit
provision spells out the purpose of Congress in enacting the citizen
suit provisions. It is more extensive than the legislative history of
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comparable provisions in subsequent environmental statutes, which
often incorporated the CAA citizen suit provision with minimal
changes. Indeed, courts refer to the CAA legislative history to help
interpret citizen suits in other statutes.289 Proponents of the provision
championed it as an antidote both to “restrained” enforcement of
former air pollution legislation 290 and to the inevitable lack of
sufficient governmental resources by even the most well-intentioned
enforcement agencies to assure compliance with the legislation. 291
There are not enough federal and state resources to enforce against all
significant violations of the environmental statutes and there never
will be. “Privatizing” enforcement is a natural legislative response,
augmenting government enforcement resources at little or no cost to
the government. That alternative is particularly attractive at the
present time, when we are struggling to reduce governmental costs at
all levels, from local to national. All studies of the incidence of citizen
suits indicate that they are an important component of environmental
enforcement, at times surpassing the government’s civil actions,
allowing it to concentrate its resources on criminal and administrative
actions.
VII
CONCLUSION
Citizen suit provisions are constitutional under Article II’s Vesting,
Take Care, and Appointments Clauses. Also, citizen suit provisions
do not violate Article II of the Constitution because they do not
aggrandize congressional or executive power and they do not take
away any power from the executive that is unambiguously and
explicitly conferred on the President by the Constitution. While some
citizen suits may interfere with executive enforcement policy by
289 See, e.g., N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 515 F. Supp. 961, 964, (D.D.C. 1981), rev’d
on other grounds, Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
290 Congress, in enacting the CAA amendments of 1970, added citizen suits for the first
time to the pollution control statute’s arsenal of enforcement devices, and also recognized
that earlier federal enforcement authorities were ineffective and cumbersome and replaced
them with streamlined and effective enforcement provisions for the government. This
resulted in insufficient government enforcement resources being the dominant reason for
citizen suits. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WORKS ACCOMPANYING S. 4358
397, 421–23.
291 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 727–30 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(comments on the Senate floor by Senator Muskie (on Sept. 21, 1970) and Senator Hart
(on Sept. 22, 1970)).
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targeting violations the government would not target, the
government’s reason not to target them is usually lack of resources. In
such cases citizen suits do not interfere with government enforcement,
they augment it. In cases where citizen enforcement could interfere
with executive enforcement policy, the citizen suit provisions give the
government sufficient authority to avoid significant interference.
The government has not complained that citizen suits hamper its
faithful execution of the laws. If anything, the executive branch has
supported citizen suits as a means of helping its faithful enforcement.
Citizen suit plaintiffs have brought hundreds of civil actions to
enforce the environmental laws, contributing to the protection of both
public health and the environment.292 Moreover, Congress would have
to considerably increase the resources allotted to governmental
enforcement to achieve the same level of pollution control without
private enforcement through citizen suits. Citizen suit provisions
provide considerable cost savings to the government and fulfill
congressional objectives. They also do not undermine the executive’s
ability to perform his or her Constitutional duties. Considering the
benefits of citizen suits, that citizen suit provisions are constitutional
and there is no evidence showing that the framers of the Constitution
considered private enforcement to be unconstitutional, the balance
weighs heavily in favor of citizen suits.

292

See supra note 36.

